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ABSTRACT 
Since the Second World War the vorld has witnessed a gigantic 
strug gle between East and West, between communism and democracy. After 
t he War the European theater was one of the main areas in 'Which this 
struggle was waged with each side seeking to extend its influence and 
. 
bl ock the advance of the other. The result was that virtually no progress 
could be made in resolving outstanding issues growing out of World War II. 
Thus for ten years the Soviet Union obstructed the re-establishment of 
Austria's independence and sovereignty. Why then did the Soviets so 
suddenly change their policy in 1955 paving the way for Austria's free-
dom? To answer this question it will be necessary to give an account of 
the developments in Austria and at the international conference table 
during this ten-year period. The first part of the thesis will draw 
mainly on the New York Times. the Reports of the Q.§.. film Commissioner 
for Austria, and various books dealing with this period. 
Yet it is not enough to merely outline the developments leading to 
the change in Soviet policy if an adequate explanation is to be provided 
for the shift 'Which occurred in 1955. Soviet foreign policy, like any 
other foreign policy, is basically determined by two factors. On the one, 
hand, it is an integral pa.rt of the overall policy of the country and as 
such closely connected with domestic events. On the other hand, it is to 
a large extent a reaction to the given international situation. In order 
to unlerstand the Soviet willingness to negotiate an Austrian peace 
settlement, internal. developments in the Soviet Union as well as the 
international situation existing at the time must be analyzed. Here, 
iv 
The Current Digest .Q! the Soviet Press proved to be a very valuable source 
of informa tion. 
The early Soviet policy toward Austria indicates that the Soviet 
Union was hoping to include, if not the whole of Austria, at least the 
Soviet zone in the satellite empire. When developments in Austria as well 
as Western opposition made the realization of this aim very unlikely, the 
negotiations on the treaty reached a stalemate. 
Tvo changes in Soviet leadership--in 1953 and in 1955--were necessary 
to break the deadlock in the negotiations on the treaty. After Stalin's 
death in 1953, several conciliatory moves by the Malenkov government 
created a more favorable international climate. Yet it was not until 
Khrushchev won power in the spring of 1955 that there was a clear break 
with Stalinist principles. The new Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence 
was an important factor in the shift of the Russian attitude toward Austria. 
An examination of the international situation at that · time reveals that 
major international problems had been settled. The political and 
military situation in Europe made an Austrian settlement feasible and 
even advantageous from the Soviet point of view. Thus it is in the 
combination of internal developments in the Soviet Union and the political 
situation on the international scene that the .reasons can be found for the 
I 
Russian withdrawal from Austria. 
I 
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I 
THE FIRST STEPS TCMARD REBUILDING A FREE 
AND INDEPENDENT AUSTRIA 
The first period, which covers the time from the Foreign Ministers 
Conference in Moscow in the fall of 1943 to the new control agreement for 
Austria on June 28, 1946, proved to be of major importance to the future 
of Austria. 
On the international stage important meetings and conferences were 
held which were to determine the course of future Regotiations for an 
Austrian state treaty. The domestic scene was characterized by the efforts 
of Austrian statesmen to set up a new government in the middle of the 
ruins and the chaos which marked the end of World War II. 
I. INTERNATIONAL EVENTS 
The major powers concerned themselves with the question of Austria 
as early as 1943, when the Foreign Ministers of Great Britain (Sir Anthony 
F.den), the United States ( Cordell Hull), and the Soviet Union (Vyacheslav 
M. Molotov) met in Moscow to discuss the post-war settlement of war-torn 
Europe. The Statement on Austria--as part of the Moscow Declaration of 
November 1, 1943-contained the basic policy of the Four Powers towards 
Austria. 1 
1The French Committee of National Liberation published a statement 
on November 16, 1943, with regard to the Moscow Declaration. It contained 
an affirmation of their belief in Austriah independence and expressed. their 
conviction that the Austrian pa~riots would participate in the liberation 
of their country. 
2 
The Anschluss or 19382 was declared null and void and the Four Powers 
expressed their intention to reestablish Austria as a free and independent 
country. 
The Governments of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the 
United States of America are agreed that Austria, the first country to 
f all a victim to Hitlerite aggression, shall be liberated from German 
domin ation. They regard the annexation imposed on Austria by Germany 
on March 15, 1938, as null and void. They consider themselves as in no 
1,1a:y bound by any changes affected in Austria since that date. They 
declare that they wish to see re-established a free and independent 
Austria and thereby to open the way for the Austrian people themselves, 
as well as those neighboring states which will be faced with similar 
problems, to find that political and economic security which is the 
only basis for lasting peace. Austria is reminded, however, that she 
has a responsibility which she cannot evade, for participation in the 
war at the side of Hitlerite Germany, and that in the final 
settlement, account will inevitably be taken of her own contribution 
to her liberation.3 
It is extremely important here to note the distinction which vas 
made between the case of Austria a.IXl the case of Germany. The Allies did 
not treat Austria as an enemy-country, but rather as Hitler's first 
victim. It was on the basis of this distinction that the Austrian question 
was not settled by a peace treaty, but by a state treaty. 
The next important step on the international scene was the Yalta 
Conference in February 1945, a meeting of the heads of government of the 
United States of America (Franklin D. Roosevelt), the Soviet Union (Joseph 
W. Stalin) and the United Kingdom (Winston Churchill).4 
2on March 13, 1938j Hitler proclaimed the union of Austria with 
Germany. Austria became part of Germany. 
3William L. Stearman, .Iru! Soviet _ Union and the . Occupation gI, Austria 
(Wien: Verlag fuer Zeitarchieve, 1957), p. 12. 
4Tbe French ProTisional Government acceded to this Declaration later. 
3 
In the Declaration on Liberated Europe the Allied Powers stated in general 
terms their approach to the post-war settlement of the European problem. 
The establishment of order in Europe and the re-building of national 
economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the 
liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and Fascism 
and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a 
principle of the Atlantic Charter-the right of all peoples to choose 
the form of government under 'Which they will live--the restoration of 
sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been 
forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations • 
• • • The three governments (United States, Soviet Union, United 
Kingdom) will jointly assist the people in any European liberated 
state ••• ; (c) to fom interim governmental authorities broadly 
representative of all democratic elements in the population and 
pled ged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections 
of governments responsive to the will of the peopleJ and (d) to 
f ac i litate 'Where necessary the holding of such elections.5 
The last important meeting of the three Big Powers which deserves 
mentioning in this context is the Berlin Conference of July and August 
1945. Three parts of that agreement, which became know as the Potsdam 
Agreement, are of special importance here. The Agreement for the 
Establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers was adopted at Berlin on 
August 1, 1945. This Agreement created the above mentioned Council, libich 
was to handle a great deal of the negotiations on the Austrian treaty. The 
same Agreement abolished the European Advisory Oonnnission since the Council 
was to take over its f'unctions. The Agreement on German Reparations, 
adopted at Berlin on August 1, 1945, proved to be of much greater 
importance. It was this particular Agreement with the clause on external 
German assets which caused so much difficulty in the negotiations on the 
5ru.chard F. Fanno {ed.), The Yalta Conference (Problems in 
American 'Civilization, Boston• D.C. Heath and Co.P 1955), P• 34. 
4 
Austrian treaty, and which was used so many times by the Soviet Union to 
justify seizures of property in Eastern Austria that were at least open to 
dispute. The important paragraphs read as follows: 
IV Reparations from Germany 
1. Reparation claims of the USSR shall be met by removal from 
the zone of Germany occupied by the USSR, and from 
appropriate external German assets. 
9. The governments of the United Kingdom and the United States 
of America renounce their claims in respect of reparations
6 to shares of ••• German assets ••• in eastern Austria. 
Part VII 
It was agreed that reparations should not be exacted from Austria. 7 
The problems caused by the different interpretations of the above cited 
clauses will be discussed at a later stage. 
These three conferences provided the guide lines for the future 
treaty negotiations, and all Four Powers again and again made reference to 
th es e conferences in order to justify and support their policies at the 
different stages of the negotiations. 
II. OOMESTIC EVENTS 
The first important step on the part of Austria herself was the 
establishment of a provisional government under Dr. Karl Renner, leader of 
the Austrian Socialist Party (Sozialistische .Partei Oesterreichs, SPOe for 
6u.s. Element of the Allied Commission for Austria, Austria! 
Graphic Survey (December 1953), p. XXIII. 
7Leland M. Goodrich and others . (eds.), Documents .Q!l American 
Foreign Relations Vol. VIII 1945-46, (Bostons World Peace Foundation, 
1947), p. 933. 
5 
short), on April 27, 1945. It consisted of ten members of the SPOe, nine 
members of the Austrian People's Party (Oesterreichische Volkspartei, OeVP 
for short), seven members of the Austrian Comnrunist Party (Konnnunistisohe 
Partei Oesterreichs, KPOe for short) and three members without party 
affiliations (experts). At that time, only the Soviet Union recognized the 
provisional government. The Western Powers regarded recognition as a 
matter to be taken up by the Allied Council, vhich had yet to be 
established. 
After its establishment, the provisional government adopted the 
Pro kl amation ueber die Unabhaengigkeit Oesterreicha (Proclamation on the 
Independence of Austria), declaring among other things that the Anschlues 
of 1938 was null and void, that Austria va.s again a democratic republic 
to be governed by the constitution of 1920, and that a provisional 
government va.s to be established with the cooperation of all anti-fascist 
par ti es i n order to achieve the aims of this proclamation. It also 
cont ain ed a statement with regard to the obligations under the Moscow 
Declaration , which read as follows: 
In pflichtgemaesser Erwaegung des Nachsatzes der Erklaerung der 
Moskauer Konferenz (ueber die Verantwortung fuer die Teilnahme am 
Krieg an der Seite Hitler Deutschlands) wird die einzusetzende Staats-
regierung ohne Verzug die Massregeln ergreifen, um jeden ihr moeg-
lichen Beitrag zu seiner Befreiung zu leisten, sieht sich jedoch 
genoetigt, festzustellenj dass dieser Beitrag angesichts der 
Entkraeftung unseres Volkes und der Ent~eterung unseres Landes zu 
ihrem Bedauern nur bescheiden sein kann.8 
8 
"With due consideration to the concluding sentence o:f the Moscow 
Declaration (on the responsibility for the participation in the war on the 
side of Germany) the future government will without delay take all steps to 
make every possible contribution to its liberation. The government, 
however, deems it necessary in this connection to point out that this 
contribution, unfortunately, can only be a small one in the light of the 
On May 1, 1945, the provisional government passed the 
Verfassungsueberleitungsgesetz (Constitutional Transition Law) by vhich 
act the constitution in force in 1929 as well as all Federal laws as of 
March 5, 1933, became effective also for the Second Republio. 9 
6 
At the beginning of July 1945, the European Advisory Commission 1 O 
met in London to discuss a control agreement for Austria. The Statement on 
Austria outlined the control machinery for Austria. The Allied Commission 
'Was to consist of the Allied Council and Executive Committee and staffs 
appointed by the four governments concerned. The tasks of the Commission 
were as follows: (a) to secure the establishment of a central Austrian 
admini str at ive machinery; (b) to prepare for a freely elected Austrian 
government; and (c) to provide for the temporary administration of 
Austria. The four military commissioners jointly exercised supreme 
authority in Austria in respect of matters affecting Austria as a wole. 11 
Ea.ch commander had full authority within his ow zone. All decisions had 
to be unanimous. The EAC also discussed the occupation zones in Austria, 
plight of the Austrian people and the severe economic situation with which 
our country has to cope." (Writer's translation). Heinrich Siegler, 
Oesterreichs ~ ~ Souveraenitaet, Neutralitaet, Prosperitae~, ~1222 
(Wien: Verlag fuer Zeitarchieve, 1959), p. 9. 
9Toe Austrian constitution could be described as a parliamentary-
presidential system. It is governed by a Federal Constitution which shows 
a strong bias toward centralism. 
10At the Moscow Conference in 1943 it was decided to establish a 
European Advisory Commission (consisting of representatives of the four 
Allies) to deal with European political problems after the end of the war. 
11In 1945 the members of the Allied CoI1D11ission for Austria werea 
General Mark W. Clark (United States of America); Lieutentant General Sir 
Richard Mccreery (United Kingdom)J Lieutenant General Emile-Marie 
Beth ouart (France); Marshal Ivan S. Koneff (Soviet Union). 
7 
and the negotiations resulted in the Agreement on Zones of Occupation in 
Austria and Administration of the City of Vienna, signed July 9, 1945. The 
Austrian territory was divided into four occupation zones excluding 
Vienna. The Russian zone included the Province of Niederoesterreich 
(Lower Austria) with the exception of Vienna and that part of the 
Province of Oberoeste;reich (Upper Austria) situated north of the river 
Danube. The American zone included that part of Oberoesterreich south of 
the Danube and the Province of Salzburg. The British zone included the 
Provinces Steiermark (Styria) and Kaernten (Carinthia), and Osttirol 
(Eastern Tyrol). The French zone comprised the Provinces Tirol (Tyrol) 
and Vorarlberg (see Figure I). Vienna, like Berlin, was divided into four 
sectors (see Figure II). 
On September 11, 1945, the Allied Council for Austria held its 
first session. 12 Here it was decided that the OeVP, SPOe and KPOe were to 
be permitted to carry out their party activities in all parts of Austria. 
It also discussed the extension of the authority of the provisional 
government to all parts of Austria, yet no decision was reached because 
of British opposition~ Finally on October 20, 1945, the Allied Council 
stated in a memorandum to Dr. Karl Renner that the four Powers approved of 
an extension of the authority of the provisional government to the whole 
of Austria. They also agreed to free elections in the same year. 13 
12For the structure of the Allied Commission see Figure III. 
13Dr. Gerald Stourzh in his book Grundzuege der oesterreichischen 
Aussenpolitik advances the idea that these elections were only possible 
because of the overconfidence of the Austrian Communists. They promised 
the Russians something like 30 per cent of the votes, which was an utter 
miscalculation. 
) 
On November 25, 1945, the first free elections were held on the 
national level (Nationalratswahlen), on the provincial level (Landtaga-
'Wa.hlen) and in the City of Vienna (Wahlen in den Gemeinderat ~). 14 
Record numbers went to the polls, the largest electoral turnout in 
Austria's history. 
After the elections all four Powers of the Allied Council 
recognized the new government. The government, under the leadership of 
Federal Chancellor Ing. Leopold Figl (OeVP),, vas composed of Dr. Adolf 
Schaerf (SPOe), Vice-Chancellor, and the Cabinet, consisting of eight 
members of the OeVP, six members of the SPOe, one member of the KPOe and 
two members without party affiliations. On December 20, 1945, D:r. Karl 
Renner was elected President of Austria by the Bundesyersammlung (Federal 
Assembly), i.e., Bundesrat (Upper House) am Nationalrat (Lower House). 15 
8 
On June 28, 1946, Austria got a new control agreement, which 
included certain restrictions with regard to the resumption of diplomatic 
relations with non-members of the United Nations (Allied Council approval 
vas necessary), the extension of the authority of the Austrian 
government over the entire territory of Austria, and a very significant 
provision regarding the law making powers of the Austrian government. All 
laws enacted by the government-with the exception of constitutional 
provisions run international agreements--were to enter into force 31 days 
after sul:mission to the Allied Council, unless "unanimously" disapproved 
14see Table I for the returns of the national elections. • 
15Parliament~ election of the president goes back to 1931 when 
Austria eliminated direct popular elections because of the existing state 
of political tension. 
\ 
\ 
9 
by the Allied Council. A comparison with the old control agreement shows 
how the powers of the Austrian government were extended. Previously all 
laws had to be "unanimously" approved by the Council. Now it was no longer 
16 possible for one single Power to block important domestic legialation. 
After the extension of the government's authority and the coming 
into force of the new control agreement, no major changes took place 
within the Austrian government. With the exception of two Communist 
17 
attempts to overthrow the government, no serious threats were posed to 
the stability of the Austrian government. The struggle for Austria's 
in dependence centered thereafter on the international level. 
It was a period of prolonged discussions and negotiations on 
vari ous levels, of hope awakened by more conciliatory attitudes of the 
Russ ians, and of frustrations after it became obvious that it was only 
another strategic move in the political chess game. Naturally, some of 
these events (such as the question of German assets), had significant 
dor:1esti c repercussions. Where i t is necessary for the purpose of this 
thesis, due reference will be made to national events; in general, 
\ however, t he emphasis will be on international events in the following 
chapters. 
16The following enumeration should give some indicat i on of the 
activ i ti es of the Allied Commission in Austria. It had to deal with: 
internat i--oruµ agreements between Austria and other countries; transport 
of corpses in the Austro-Swiss frontier traffic; denazification; replacement 
of German legislation by Austrian laws; demilitarization; censorship; or 
installation of a telephone which had to be connected ta a switchboard 
which happened to be in a different zone. 
17 , 
For further details see Chapter V, PP• 41-44. 
II 
NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN AUSTRIAN STATE TREATY: 
HIASE I 
The first period of the negotiations is an excellent illustration 
of the political "tug-of-var" between East and West. After the end of the 
war Austrian statesmen naturally were interested in settling the Austrian 
question as soon as possible and in restoring Austria's sovereignty and 
independence. Yet it took almost two years before the Austrian question 
vas even put on the agenda of the Council of Foreign Ministers. 'While the 
United States was making every possible effort to open negotiations on 
Austria, the Russians were outright opposed to this, arguing that it was 
too early and that other questions, such as the Italian treaty or the 
treaties for the Balkan states, had to be settled first. Even among the 
Western Powers there was no unanimity as to how and when the Austrian 
question should be, handled. 
L THE STRUGGLE TO GET THE AUSTRIAN QUESTION ON THE AGENDA 
At the beginning of May 1946, United States Secretary of State 
James Byrnes submitted a draft treaty for the settlement of the Austrian 
question to the Council of Foreign Ministers in Paris. The main 
provisiomof the draft were: (a) Austria should regain her independence; 
(b) Austria had to protect democratic liberties such as freedom of speech, 
religion, etc.; (c) the Big Four would recognize and comn1it themselves to 
defend the independence of Austria; (d) the German assets question would 
be handled in accordance with the Potsdam Agreement; (e) freedom of 
11 
commerce would be guaranteed on the Danube; (f) armaments would be limited 
to those necessary for internal order; and (g) the frontiers with 
Czechoslovakia, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Hungary and Germany would 
remain as of January 1, 1938. The frontier with Italy would remain too, 
but some guarantees for civil liberties would be provided. 
Yet the Soviet Union was not willing to discuss the Austrian 
question. No progress was to be expected on that point. For this reason 
Secretary Byrnes proposed to call a 21-nation peace conference in Paris 
around the middle of July with the hope of finding a more responsive 
forum there and of getting the Austrian question on the agenda. This 
I 
pro posal "Was supported by Bevin (United Kingdom) and Bidault (France), 
but was opposed by Molotov. 
Finally the futile meeting was recessed until June 15, without arcy-
agreement on the major issues. Byrnes in his report on the Paris 
Conference said among other thingss "• •• it is particularly important 
t hat we press forward with the Austrian treaty. The Moscow Declaration 
contemplated that Austria should be regarded more as a liberated than as 
a sa tellite country. 1 The making of peace with Austria is essential to the 
restoration of anything like conditions of peace in Europe. 112 
The Council resumed its session on June 15j 1946, without 
reaching any further agreement on the Austrian treaty. An excerpt of the 
10n more than one occasion it was ma.de clear by the Western Powers 
that Austria was not regarded as an enenzy-country. ·On October 28, 1946, 
President Truman issued a statement to the effect that Austria was a 
"liberated" country~ The United Kingdom adopted the same viev. 
2 New York Times, March 21, 1946, p. 4. 
12 
report by the Secretary of State (Byrnes) on this meeting gives a good 
illustration of the positions of the four Powers. 
Finally, we crune to a discussion of the Austrian problem. On 
June 1, I had circulated a proposed draft treaty recognizing the 
independence of Austria and providing for the withdrawal of the 
occupying troops. The British also had submitted a draft for 
consideration. I asked that the Deputies be directed to prepare 
the treaty. 
The Soviets submitted a counterproposal calling first for further 
action to insure the de-Nazification of Austria and the removal of a 
large number of displaced persons from Austria whom they regarded as 
unfriendly to them. 
The British and French were willing to join us in submitting to 
the Deputies the consideration of the treaty and in requesting the 
Control Council to investigate and report on the progress of 
de-Nazification and the problem of the displaced persons. But the 
Soviets were unwilling to agree to the Deputies' talcing up the 
Austrian treaty until more tangible action was talcen on these other 
two problems.3 
Thi s meeting, however, was significant insofar as the Council 
rejec ted Austria's claims to part of Southern Tyrol on the grounds that 
this would constitute a major border rectification. 
Although Austria was not on the agenda of the 21-nation peace 
conference in Paris,4 that conference was of considerable importance 
since it helped to settle the problem of Southern Tyrol. The Austrian 
government sent a note to the Paris peace conference asking for self-
determination of Southern Tyrol. The conference voted for a hearing on 
the problem of Southern Tyrol. After long bilateral negotiations between 
the Austrian Foreign Minister, Dr. Karl Gruber, am the Italian Prime 
JLeland M. Goodrich and others (eds.), Documents .Q!! American 
Foreign Relations Vol. VIII 1945-46, (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 
1947), p. 284. 
4Austrian delegates were .seated at the Paris peace conference, but 
they had no voice. 
Minister, Alcide de Gasperi, a compromise was achieved, which was to be 
submitted to the Paris peace conference and the Council of Foreign 
Ministers. 5 The Gruber-de Gasperi Agreement was signed on September 5, 
1946, and was incorporated in the Appendix of the Italian Peace Treaty 
on the basis of a decision of the Council of Foreign Ministers during 
their meeting in New York in November and December 1946. 
1.3 
When the next meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers6 took 
place in New York (November-December 1946), Austria once more was not on 
the agenda. The Soviet Union was still unwilling to discuss the Austrian 
state treaty. Yet this meeting was of great significance to Austria. First, 
two proposals for a settlement of the German and Austrian questions were 
subnitted by the United States and the Soviet Union. Second, and most 
important of all, the Big Four agreed to put Austria on the agenda of 
their next meeting, which was to be held in Moscow in March 194 7. True, 
Austria was at the bottom of the list, but at least she was on the 
agenda. In addition~ the Council agreed to appoint special deputies to 
study the Austrian and German treaties at a meeting scheduled for 
January 14, 1947. This was the first positive step toward a settlement 
of the Austrian question; Austria finally was a conference issue. 
On January 15, 194 7, the Foreign Ministers Deputies began their 
5The compromise was as follows: The entire area of Southern Tyrol 
would remain within the Italian territorial sovereignty, but the 
Austrian population in this area was to get regional autonomy and 
minority privileges. 
6 Representatives on the Council were: Ernest Bevin (United 
Kingdom); James Byrnes (United States); V. M. Molotov (Soviet Union); 
and Maurice Couve de Murville (France). 
► 
14 
talks in London. Their task was to draw up two treaties, one for Germany 
and one for Austria. From the very beginning tension arose between the 
West and the Soviet Union. The latter wanted to complete the German 
treaty first and then discuss the Austrian one, while the West wanted to 
discuss them simultaneously. It was the Western approach which finally 
prevailed. 
The Austrian government was invited to state its point of view on 
the treaty, and Federal Chancellor Leopold Figl appeared before the 
conference. Foreign Minister Karl Gruber outlined at a later stage the 
Austrian aims with regard to the treaty. The treaty should: (a) re-
establish Austria's borders as of January 1, 1938; (b) recognize 
Austria's status as a member of the community of nations and prompt 
withdrawal of the occupation forces; and (c) completely and clearly 
separate Austria from Germany (economically, financially and politically). 
Soon it bee~ obvious that the delegates were faced with major 
difficulties as to the treaty. The disagreement centered on1 (1) the 
question of German assets in Austria;? (2) the guarantee of Austria's 
borders. The United States was particularly interested in the protection 
of the eastern border, the actual frontiers of Austria and the wording of 
7This question will be dealt with rather extensively in Chapters 
V and VI of this thesis. For our purposes here it suffices to point out 
that the disagreement was caused by different definitions of German 
assets by the Western Powers on the one hand, and the Soviet Union on the 
other. The clause of the Potsdam Agreement which deals with this 
question is rather vague (see Chapter I, p. 4). While the Western Powers 
used the definition given by the United Nations in January 194.3, known as 
the London Declaration, the Russians used their own definition which was 
much more advantageous for their particular aimse 
i 
f 
the preamble. 8 
Yet as compared to the draft for the German treaty, a certain 
progress vas achieved in the negotiations for the Austrian treaty. 
Several clauses were approved, among others a clause providing for a 
democratic system vith secret ballot and universal suffrage; a clause 
ma.king it mandatory for Austria to protect human rights; and a clause 
providing for a restoration of documents from Austria to Germany and 
vice versa. 
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Toward the middle of February another problem threatened to 
deadl ock the negotiations. Yugoslavia claimed parts of Carinthia, 9 and 
her clai ms were supported by the Soviet Union. The Western Powers 
r ej ect ed the Yugoslav claim, and urged a restoration of the borders of 
January 1, 1938. While the conference had reached a stalemate on this 
question, progress was ma.de in some other areas. The conference finished 
work Ylith some of the military clauses, dealing vith the withdrawal of 
8 In the preamble to the treaty the Russians wanted to pin as much 
war guilt on Austria as possible, while the United Kingdom and the 
Uni ted States wanted to make Austria lo~k like the unhappy victim . No 
agr eement was reached on th i s point. 
9rn 1910, 304,287 Germans and 82,212 Slovenes lived in Cari nthia 
(figures taken from the Encyclopaedia Britannica). After the World War I 
the Yugoslav claimed the south eastern part of Carinthia with the capital 
Klagenfurt. Under the Treaty of St. Germain an area of 128 sqmi . was 
given to Yugoslavia. The other disputed area, however, was subjected to a 
plebiscite under the supervision of the Inter-Allied Plebiscite 
Connnission. The territory was divided into two zones. Zone A was rural 
vith a population of about 78,000 . Zone B included the City of Klagenfurt 
with a German majority . The results in Zone A showed a heavy majority in 
favor of staying with Austria. On the basis 9f these results, the 
plebiscite in the other Zone was cancelled. 
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the occupation forces, the Austrian air force, etc. 10 
When the London conference ended on February 25, 1947, the 
prospects for an Austrian treaty were rather good. The conference had 
worked out a rough draft of the treaty with a preamble of nine 
paragraphs (five of 'Which were fully approved), and 53 potential clauses. 
13 of these clauses were never discussed by the Deputies. Of the 40 
clauses discussed, 27 were either fully agreed to or the differences 
were only of a minor nature. 
The major areas of disagreement at the end of the conference were 
the question of German assets, the Yugoslav territorial claims, and the 
dispute between East and West as to 'Whether the preamble should state 
that Austria was a liberated country or not. The Western Powers, 
however, were confident that the Council of Foreign Ministers me~ting in 
Moscow could settle the remaining problems. 
II. 'IHE MOSCOW CONFERENCE: A GREAT DISAPPOINTMENT 
On March 10, the meeting of the Counc11 of Foreign Ministers 
opened in Moscow. The atmosphere was friendly, and progress was made on 
several clauses. However, it soon became obvious that the question of 
German assets in Austria would pose considerable problems. The Russians 
wanted the Western Powers to recognize the Soviet seizures in the · 
10The Deputies agreed that 90 days after the signing of the State 
Trea ty al l occupying forces were to be withdrawn. As far as the air 
f orc e was concerned, it was agreed that Austria was to have 90 planes, 
not more than 70 could be or combat type, and none of these were 
supposed to be bombers. The maximum personnel of the air force was to 
be 5,000 men. 
,Jc 
~ 
eastern zone of Austria. 11 The West, which adhered to a different 
definition of German assets, was unwilling to do this, and the 
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conference reached a dead end on this issue. But there was still hope 
for agreement. Toward the end of March the Council invited Austrian 
representatives to attend the conference, and to present their 
government's view. The negotiations went fairly well with the exception 
of the clause on German assets and the territorial claims which were 
brought up again by Yugoslavia; these were firmly rejected by Foreign 
Minister Karl Gruber. In addition to the territorial claims, Yugoslavia 
also made reparation claims against Austria which were supported by the 
Soviet Union, and were firmly rejected by the Western Powers and Austria. 
It was on these three issues that the conference finally reached 
complete stalemate. The conference ended on April 25, 1947, with no 
agreement on these major points; in fact, the two Blocs were further 
apart on these issues than at the beginning of the conference. In order 
to cont inue the discussions, the conference appointed a Four Power 
Commission to study further the issue. 
' III. '!HE CHERRIERE PLAN 
On May 12, 194 7, the Four Power Connnission, established at the 
Moscow Conference, held its first session in Vienna. The negotiations 
11At the beginning of July 1946, the Russians seized a number of 
enterprises and factories in the eastern zone of Austria, claiming that 
these enterprises fell under the heading of German assets. The Western 
Powers, relying on the Declaration on Forced Transfer of Property in 
Enemy Controlled Country (London Declaration) rejected the Russian 
claims, and refused to recognize the legality of the Soviet seizures. 
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proceeded very slowly. The Commission held 85 sessions between May 12, 
and October 11, 1947. On October 8, the French delegate General Paul 
Cherri~re submitted a plan for the settlement of the German assets 
question. Tb.is plan became known as the Cherriere Plan. 12 However, there 
was no agreement on the Plan, and it was submitted to the Council of 
Foreign Ministers at their next meeting in London (November 25-
December 15). 13 Yet here too, no agreement was achieved on this Plan. The 
Russians were prepared to accept it in principle, but reserved the right 
to make certain counterproposals with regard to individual items. 
On January 24, 1948, the Russians made their reply to the 
Cherriere Plan. They were willing to accept it, but they demanded two-
thirds of the current oil production; two-thirds of the oil exploration 
areas; oil refineries with a capacity of 450,000 tons per year for fifty 
years; all possessions of the Donaudampfschiffahrtsgesellschaft in 
Ht¢gary, Rumania and Bulgaria and 25 per cent of its assets in Austria; 
and a sum of $200 million payable in two years. 14 
12According to this Plan, the German assets demarrled by the USSR 
should be divided into two categoriesz (a) all demands regarding the 
Austrian oil production and the Donaudampfschiffahrtsgesellschaft 
(Danube Steam Ship Company); (b) all other demands. Concessions regarding 
Austri an oi l: the Soviet Union was to get 50 per cent of the current oil 
pro:iuc tio n; one-third of the oil exploration areas around Zistersdorf 
(main Aust rian oil fields); and refineries with an annual capacity between 
250,000 and 300,000 tons. As for the DDSG claims, the USSR "W8.S to get all 
its ass ets in Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania. All other claims should be 
met by a payment of $100 million. 
13Ernest Bevin (United Kingdom); V. M. Molotov (Soviet Union); 
Georges Bidault (France); George Marshall (United States). 
1
'4iieinrich Siegl~r, Oesterreichs Weg ~ Souveraeirltaet, Neutrali-
taet, Prosperitaet, ~-12-22 (Wiens Verlag fuer Zeitarchieve, 1959), p. 25. 
f 
._ 
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Despite these demands and the difficulties they posed, the West and 
Austria were still optimistic and were hoping to arrive at a compromise. 
The Foreign Ministers Deputies held their next meeting from 
February 13 to March 31, 1948, in London.15 They dealt with two 
problems: the Cherriere Plan and the Yugoslav claims. Despite some 
concessions on part of the Soviet Union (she was willing to reduce the 
payment to $150 million payable in six years instead of two, as well as 
some other minor changes), no agreement was reached on the Plan. 
Yugoslavia again made her territorial claims to Carinthia. Russia's 
support of the Yugoslav claims made further discussion futile, and the 
meeting ended in a deadlock. Dr. Karl Gruber, Austrian Foreign Minister, 
used excerpts from the meeting to describe the general Russian attitude. 
Mr. Koktomov: The position of the Soviet Delegation is quite 
clear in that it supports the Yugoslav claims. 
Mr. Marjoribanks: Do the compromise proposals envisaged by the 
Soviet Delegation still involve the cession of Austrian 
territory to Yugoslavia? 
Va-. Koktomovi Yes. 
Mr. Reber: Now further discussion seems to be futile. I will not 
bargain over Austria's frontiers. 16 
This statement was later on denied by the Russians. In the meantime, 
15
united Kingdom: James Marjoribanks (Austrian expert in the 
British Foreign Office); United States: Sa.mu.el Reber · (career diplomat); 
France: General Paul Cherriere; Soviet Unionz Commercial Counsellor 
Nicolai Koktomov. 
16Karl Gruber, Between Liberation m:!9. Liberty _(New York: Frederick 
A. Praeger, Inc., 1955), PP• 154-155. 
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relations between Yugoslavia and Russia were deteriorating. The Foreign 
Ministers Deputies met again from February 8 to May 10, 1949. By then a 
violent press war was going on between Belgrad and Moscow. The issues 
were still the sames the German assets and the Yugoslav claims. No 
agreement was arrived at on either point. 
It was not until the Foreign Minsters Conference in Paris from 
May 24 to June 20, 1949, 17 that some progress was finally achieved. At 
this meeting the Soviet delegation suddenly cea~ed to support the 
Yugoslav claims. Andrej Vishinsky stated that the Soviet Union still 
regarded the Yugoslav claims as justified, but that it 'WB.S no longer 
wil li ng t o support them. The Soviet Union was primarily interested in 
set tli ng the German assets question and was not that much concerned 
about the Yugoslav claims. 
In general this conference gave new hopes to the Western Powers 
and Austria for an early settlement of the problem. The representatives 
reached agreement on the main principles of an Austrian treaty. The 
communique of June 21, 1949, adequately described the progress wich had 
been ma.de. The Austrian frontiers were the same as those of January 1, 
1938; Austria was not obliged to pay reparations; and the question of 
German assets was settled in principle. The Deputies were instructed to 
draw up a draft treaty on the basis of these agreed principles. 
The Deputies met from July 4 to September 1, 1949, in London and 
17nean Acheson (United States); Ernest Bevin (United Kingdom); 
Robert Schuman (France); Andrej Vishinsky (Soviet Union). 
\ 
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on September 22 and 23, in New York, without reaching agreement.18 The 
Deputies resumed discussions from October 10, 1949, to April 26, 1950, 
yet no further progress was ma.de, and another futile session came to an 
end. At the request of the Soviet delegate Georgij Zarubin, a new 
meeting was called on May 4, 1950. Here the Russians brought up a new 
issue. Zarubin accused the West of violating the Italian Peace Treaty by 
still maintaining troops in Trieste. He demanded a settlement of this 
question before any further talks on an Austrian treaty could take 
place. 19 At this time it was obvious that the Russians were not willing 
to discuss seriously the Austrian treaty. No constructive talks took 
place for about two years. 
18There were basically five major areas yet to be settledz 
(a) the relief to displaced persons; (b) the Soviet Union wanted to 
prevent Austria from employing foreign military advisors and experts. 
The West regarded this an unnecessary restriction; (c) the ~uestion of 
the compensation for the transfer of United Nations property in Austria. 
The Western Powers wanted some compensation for transfers of property 
after the Anschluss in those cases where no compensation had been offered. 
The Soviet Union was against this since it seemed to benefit primarily the 
Western Powers; (d) disputes over the Austrian obligations with regard to 
debts incurred during the war; (e) post-war debts. ,The Soviet Union 
wanted Austria to pay for all Allied supplies, services, etc., while the 
United States 'Was willing to waive these claims. William L. Stearman, 
The Soviet Union and the Occupation .QI.. Austria (Wien: Verlag fuer 
Zeitarchieve, 1957), P• 142. 
19 Siegler, £12• cit., pp. 28-29. 
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NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN AUSTRIAN STATE TREATYz 
PHASE II 
As already indicated, the next period was one of almost complete 
standstill in the negotiations between the four Powers with regard to an 
Austrian state treaty. It was primarily the Soviet Union which frustrated 
all further negotiations. It brought up new issues such as the question 
of Trieste, accused Austria of not having sufficiently complied vi.th 
denazification and demilitarization requirements, and finally refused to 
send representatives to the scheduled meetings. 
Yet despite all these obstacles, efforts were being made by the 
Western Powers arrl Austria to continue the negotiations and to arrive at 
a settlement of the Austrian question. 
On January 19, 1952, an invitation was extended to the Soviet 
Union to resume negotiations. The Soviet answer to the Secretary-General 
of the Conference of Foreign Ministers Deputies was as follows: 
Dear Mr. Dowing, 
In connection with your letter of 19 January, the Soviet 
delegation considers it necessary to state that, as formerly, it 
considers that the question of the Austrian Treaty cannot be 
examined independently of the fulfillment by the Austrian 
Government of the decision of the Four Powers on the 
demilitarization and denazification of Austria and the question 
. of the fulfillment by the Governments of Great Britain, the United 
States of America and France of their obligations according to the 
peace treaty with Italy in that part which concerns the Free 
Territory of Trieste. Your answer to the letter of the Soviet 
delegation, which was received on the 19 January, requires study. 
In view of this, the Soviet representative will not be able to 
attend the meeting of the Deputies on the 21 January. 
Yours sincerely, 
V. Jerofejev 1 
This clearly indicated that the Russians were not interested in 
continuing constructive talks at that point. 
In an attempt to get the discussions started again the Western 
Po-wers, with the consent of the Austrian government, submitted an 
"abbreviated treaty" comprising only eight articles, as compared to the 
53 articles of the original draft. The main provisions of this treaty 
were to end the occupation and to reestablish Austria's independence. 
The West also wanted a clause renouncing claims to German assets in 
Austria, a demand 'Which was utterly unacceptable to the Soviet Union. 
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From here on the contacts between the Western Powers, Austria and 
the Soviet Union were maintained through the conventional diplomatic 
channels. The Austrian state treaty became the subject of a rather 
intensive exchange of notes. 
On August 14, 1952, the Russians demanded in a note to the 
Western Powers the withdrawal of the "abbreviated treaty." The Western 
Powers proposed in reply to the Soviet Union (September 5, 1952) 
another meeting of the Foreign Ministers Deputies; the Russians, however, 
were not 'Willing to participate in the meeting. 
In the face of these obstacles Austria turned to the United 
1Karl Gruber, Between Liberation .and Liberty (Nev Yor:\(1 Frederick 
A. Praeger, Inc., 1955), pp. 202-203. 
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Nations. The Soviet Union was opposed to any discussion of the Austrian 
question by the United Nations, but despite this every government in the 
world received a memorandum on July 31, 1952, describing the problems and 
the stage of the negotiations of the Austrian treaty. 
The Austrian Foreign Minister, Karl Gruber, visited Brazil in 
July 1952, and .got its support for the Austrian cause. Brazil was willing 
to take the initiative on the Austrian question in the United Nations. 2 
Brazil sent a note to the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
(September 18, 1952) requesting that Austria be put on the agenda of the 
General Assembly. The note was co-sponsored by Holland, Lebanon and 
Mexico.3 
Thus the agenda included an item called "Question of an Appeal to 
the Powers, Signator~es to the Moscov Declaration of 1 November 1943, for 
an Early Fulfillment of their Pledges towards Austria. 11 The Soviet Union 
filed an unsuccessful protest. Mexico presented a motion to invite 
Austria to present its case to the world forum, and Foreign Minister 
Karl Gruber addressed the General Assembly on behalf of Austria. The 
appeal was approved by a great majority giving Austria the support of 
the Latin American, African and Asian countries.4 
Although the Russians did not immediately return to the 
2Austria needed somebody to present her case to the United Nations, 
since she was not a member of this organization at that time. 
3 Gruber, m2• cit., PP• 276-297. 
448 countries voted in favor of the appeal. Not a single country 
was opposed. Afghanistan and Pakistan abstained. The countries of the 
Soviet Bloc did not participate in the voting. 
conferen ce table, the atmosphere improved somewhat after the interlude 
at t he United Nations. Austrian Foreign Minister Karl Gruber met Jacob 
Malik, Soviet Ambassador to London, for an exchange of opinions. 
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On January 12, 1953, the three Western Powers sul:mitted a note to 
the USSR proposing new negotiations on Austria. The Soviet Union answered 
with a note on January 27, denouncing the United Nations appeal yet 
indicating their willingness to participate in discussions if the 
"abbreviated treaty" was withdrawn. On February 9, the Foreign Ministers 
Deputies met, yet no progress was made. The West insisted on the 
"abbreviated treaty" while the Soviet Union bluntly refused to discuss it. 
The Western Powers suggested another meeting. The Soviet Union refused to 
come, because it considered such a meeting a waste of time. 
On June 25, 1953, Dr. Karl Gruber asked the Indian Prime Minister 
Jawa.harlal Nehru for his good offices for the restoration of Austria's 
independence. Krishna Menon, wo visited Moscow somewhat later, did 
discuss the Austrian question with Molotov; however, no immediate change 
of the Soviet attitude occurred. 5 
Austria transmitted a note to the Soviet Union on June JO, 1953, 
indicating her willingness to enter into diplomatic negotiations 
concerning the Austrian state treaty. In answer to Austria and the three 
Western Powers, Russia indicated its willingness to enter diplomatic 
negotiations if the "abbreviated treaty" was withdrawn. 
5Heinrich Siegler, Oesterreichs Weg ~ .Souveraenitaet, Neutrali-
taet, Prosperitaet, 12ki~l.25.2. (Wien: Verlag fuer Zeitarchieve, 1959), 
PP• 32-JJ. 
26 
On August 16, 1953, the Western Powers transmitted a note to the 
Soviet Union indicating their withdrawal of the "abbreviated treaty." On 
August 19, 1953, Austria approved the withdrawal of the "abbreviated 
treaty." 
While there was little progress on the international scene, the 
Russians suddenly showed a much more conciliatory attitude toward Austria. 
They exchanged ambassadors, replaced the military High Connnissioner with 
a civilian High Commissioner, and on July JO, they announced their 
6 decision to renounce the occupation costs Austria had to pay so far. 
The Federal Chancellor Julius Raab gave expression to the new hope by 
saying that these steps clearly indicated that Austria had entered a new 
phase in relations with the Eastern Bloc. 
Yet at the same time a new issue was introduced into the 
discussions on the international level. On August 4, 1953, the Soviet 
Union indicated in a note to the Western Powers that the Austrian 
question could be solved much easier in the light of a solution of the 
German question. On November 25, 1953, the Western Powers transmitted 
three identical notes to the USSR expressing their willingness to 
discuss any proposal for a solution of the Austrian question provided it 
was not connected with any other question. This exchange of notes finally 
led to a new important meeting between the Big Four--the Berlin Con-
ference from January 25 to February 18, 1954. 7 The differences as to the 
6The United States of America renounced the occupation costs as 
early as June 1947. On August 18, 1953, the British decided to 
renounce the occupation costs as of January 1, 1954. A similar decision 
was announced by the French on September 19, 1953. 
7John Foster Dulles (United States of America), Georges Bidault 
(France); Anthony F.den (United Kingdom); V. M. Molotov (Soviet Union). 
agenda were finally settled, and the Conference could begin. During the 
dis cuss ion of the Austrian treaty, the Austrian Foreign Minister Ing. 
Leopol d Fig l 8 and State Secretary Bruno-Kreisky were allowed to 
partici pat e. 
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On February 12, 1954, Foreign Minister Figl appealed to the four 
Power s t o settle the Austrian question as soon as possible. The same day 
V. M. Molotov presented the Russian proposal for the state treaty. The 
Deputies should draw up a final draft of the treaty within three months. 
Several new points were to be taken into consideration& (1) Austria had 
to refrain from entering into any military alliance, and was not allowed 
to have any foreign military bases on her territory; (2) the Soviet Union 
ws willing to accept the $150 million payment in kind instead of cash; 
(3) withdrawal of occupation troops could take place only after the 
conclusion of a treaty with Germany; (4) the question of Trieste had to 
be solved. 9 
Foreign Minister Figl stated his disappointment with regard to the 
Russian proposal. A treaty without withdrawal of the occupation troops 
would be a farce. The Western Powers, too, voiced their strong opposition 
to the proposal, in particular to linking the Austrian problem with the 
German peace treaty and to neutralizing Austria. If Austria were 
voluntarily to choose neutrality, the West would be glad to recognize it, 
but it could not be forced upon a country. Yet despite all the con-
8 
On November 26, 1953, Dr. Karl Gruber resigned his post, Ing. 
Leopold Figl became the new Austrian Foreign Minister. 
9 · -Siegler, .QJ2• cit., p. 36. 
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cessions that the Western Powers were willing to make if the Soviet Union 
were to drop the demand for neutralization and to withdraw its occupation 
troops, the Soviet Union was not willing to give in on these points. 
On February 16, 1954, the Austrian Foreign Minister Figl declared 
Austria's willingness to adopt the status of a neut~al country, however, 
the clause on the occupation troops was utterly unacceptable. Molotov . 
was delighted over Austria's attitude toward neutrality, yet was not 
will in g to compromise on the issue of the occupation troops. 10 
When the Conference ended on February 18, 1954, the withdrawal of 
troops was the only unresolved question. Yet in view of the Russian 
refusal to compromise on that issue, the Western Powers withdrew their 
approval of the five disputed articles. Thus a conference which had 
aroused so many hopes in Austria and in the Western countries proved to 
be another disappointment. 
Yet the struggle went on. In May 1954, the Austrian Parliament 
passed a resolution, expressing Austria's determination not to 
surrender Austria's sovereignty arrl to insist upon the fulfillment of the 
Moscow Declaration of November 1, 1943. Again attempts were made to 
resume negotiations, but they were fruitless. It seemed once more that 
the negotiations had reached a deadlock. 
10 Ib id. , p. 37. 
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NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN AUSTRIAN STATE TREATYz 
PHASE III 
The Berlin Conference marked the end of another unsuccessful 
attempt to draw up a state treaty for Austria. Again all hope had 
vanished for an early fulfillment of the promise of the Moscow 
Declaration of November 1, 1943. No important meeting took place for the 
rest ·of 1954. Both sides were unwilling to compromise. 
Then came the historic speech of V. M. Molotov at a session of the 
Supreme Soviet on February 8, 1955. The Soviets, all of a sudden, showed 
willingness to compromise on the issues which led to the deadlock of the 
Berlin Conference in 1954. 
The Soviet Union attaches great significance to the settlement of 
the Austrian question, the question of a full restoration of the 
independence of a democratic Austria. At the same time one cannot 
fail to take into consideration those dangers which the plans of 
militarization of Western Germany, such as the Paris agreements, 
bring for Austria. 
The settlement of the Austrian question cannot be examined 
independently of the German question, especially in view of the 
existing plans of remilitarization of Western Germany, which 
increases the threat of absorbtion, the Anschluss of Austria. 
The withdrawal of the armed forces of the four powers from 
Austria can be achieved without awaiting the conclusion of the peace 
treaty with Germany. 
Austria must take upon herself not to enter any kind of coaiition 
or military alliance directed against any power which took part with 
its armed forces in the war against Hitlerite Germany and in the 
liberation of Austria and not to allow also the creation on her 
territory of foreign military bases. 
In the interest of speedy settlement of the Austrian question an 
immediate convening of the four power conferenc~ is necessary at which 
the German questi~n on the conclusion of the state treaty with Austria 
will be examined. 
1New York Times, February 9, 1955, P• 6. 
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This showed that the Russians were 'Willing to compromise on the 
most important point, making the withdrawal of troops from Austria no 
longer dependent on a German peace treaty a.n:i representing a complete 
reversal of their position at the Berlin Oonference. It seemed that this 
time there was real hope for the conclusion of a state treaty. 
The Austrian government instructed the Austrian Ambassador to 
Moscow, Norbert Bischoff, to establish contacts with the Soviets. The 
Austrian Ambassador, in fact, had three meetings with Molotov. At the 
first meeting on February 25, 1955, Molotov affirmed the Soviet stand 
that the German peace treaty was no longer regarded as a prerequisite 
for the withdrawal of troops from Austria. The second meeting (March 2, 
1955) served as a further clarification of the issues. The Austrian 
Ambassador assured Molotov that Austria herself wants to prevent a 
second Anschluss by any means. Molotov wanted an official answer from 
Austria with regard to his speech on February 8. This official statement 
was transmitted to Molotov at the third meeting with the Austrian 
Ambassador, March 14, 1955. 
This official statement, the Dreipunkteerklaerung, declared that: 
{a) Austria welcomed the guarantee of her independence and freedom and 
the protection against a second Ansohluss; (b) Austria was willing to 
give a declaration to the effect that she would refrain from entering 
into any military alliances and would not permit any foreign bases on 
her territory; and (c) that a solution of the Austrian question could be 
worked out only at~ ~ew conference and with the participation of Austria. 2 
2Heinrich Siegler, Oesterreichs Weg zur Souveraenitaet, Neutrali-
taet, Prosperita~t, m-1222. {Wien: Verlag fuer Zeitarchieve, 1959). P• 39. 
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On March 24, 1955, Molotov received the Austrian Ambassador in 
Moscow and gave him the answer to the Austrian Dreipunkteerklaerung. The 
Soviet Union recognized the necessity to discuss the withdrawal of 
troops and th~ guarantee of Austria's freedom; she was prepared to 
negotiate on a declaration 0£ neutrality and she was willing to discuss 
the Austrian state treaty at a special four Power conference. 3 
In addition, Molotov extended an invitation to the Austrian 
Federal Chancellor Ing. Julius Ra.ab and other Austrian representatives to 
come to Moscow. On March 29, 1955, the Austrian Council of Ministers 
accepted the invitation. The delegation to Moscow consisted of Federal 
Chancellor Ra.ab, Vice-Chancellor Dr. Adolf Schaerf, Foreign Minister Ing. 
Leopold Figl, and State Secretary Dr. Bruno Kreisky. 
On April 4, 1955, the Western Powers transmitted a note to 
Austria, expressing their confidence in the Austrian steps. They 
indicated, however, that the state treaty and all its provisions had to 
be approved by all the Allies. On April 9, Moscow notified the Western 
Powers of the visit of the Austrian delegation to Moscow.4 
The meeting in Moscow lasted only three days, from April 12 to 
April 15, 1955, but these days determined the fate of the Austrian 
future. Tne results of this conference were sUllllll8.I'ized in the official 
communique.5 The main points of the communique were: (a) Austria would 
3Ibid. 
4 
Ibid • , p. 41 • 
5For text of the communique see Appendix A. 
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bec ome neutral. She was willing to follow a policy similar to that of 
Switzerland. The Soviet Union on the other hand expressed her 'Willingness 
to recognize a declaration to that effect; (b) the Soviet Union was 
willing to sign the treaty immediately, and would withdraw her troops by 
the end of 1955; (c) the USSR was willing to accept the $150,000,000 in 
goods; (d) Russia would sell all oil interests to Austria for 10,000,000 
tons of crude oil; (e) the USSR would hand over all assets of the Danube 
Steamship Company (DDSG) in Austria for $2,000,000; and (f) Russia 
promised to release all Austrian prisoners of war in Russia. 6 The 
Austrian delegation was overjoyed. Federal Chancellor Raab telephoned to 
Vienna: "Austria will be free, and we will receive back our native soil 
in its entirety. Our war prisoners will be free again. 117 These 
concessions were extraordinary. These terms were much better than the 
ones the Western Powers were willing to accept at Berlin in 1954. 
On April 19, 1955, Moscow sent a note to the Western Powers and 
Austria suggesting a conference of the Foreign Ministers in Vienna. In 
their answer of April 21, 1955, the Western Powers suggested in return a 
conference of Ambassadors to examine the Moscow proposals. The USSR 
ag::-eed, and the Ambassadors met in Vienna from May 2 to May 12, 1955. 
The discussi ons centered ma.inly on three major points. The first point 
which was discussed extensively and which was finally approved by all 
Powers was the question of the restitution of German property. The 
6 
New~ Times, April 16, 1955, p. 2. 
7Ibid., April 15, -1955, P• 1. 
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per iod within which the German property should be returned was to be laid 
down by the treaty. The agreement was that two months after the entering 
into force of the treaty, all German property was to be returned to 
Austria. In this connection the Russians insisted on adding another 
clause which forbade Austria to return German property beyond a certain 
value to German physical or juridical persons. Oil fields had to remain 
under Austrian ownership. The second major conference issue was the with-
drawal of the occupation troops. It was agreed upon to withdraw all 
occupation troops within 90 days after the entering into force of the 
treaty. In addition, another issue was brought up: the claims of French, 
British and American oil companies. These claims, however, were not 
settled by the state treaty, but were dealt with in separate agreements.8 
.All other issues were settled at the Ambassadors Conference, and 
the only thing which remained to be done, was to sign the treaty. This 
was done on May 15, 1955, in the Marmorsaal of the Schloss Belyed.er~, 
Prince Eugene's beautiful castle. The Austrian State Treaty was signed 
by Vyacheslav M. Molotov for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 
Har old Macmillan for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Irel and , John F. Dulles for the United States of America, Antoine Pinay 
for Fr ance, and Ing. Leopold Figl for the Republic of Austria. Austria 
was free again. 
On June 5, 1955, the Austrian Nationalrat adopted a decision to 
proclaim Austria's neutrality. This proclamation was presented to the 
8
siegler, .Q.!2• ill•, p. 43° 
Nationalrat on October 26, 1955, as a constitutional law, and was 
passed and entered i nto force on November 5, 1955. 
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On September 19, 1955, the last Allied soldier left Austria. After 
ten years of hard struggle, of hope and frustration, Austria was again 
a free, independent and sovereign country. 
V 
THE ROLE OF TBE AUSTRIAN COMMUNIST PARTY 
Though essential, the chronological account of the events between 
1945 and 1955 provides only the very basic structure, the skeleton, of 
the work undertaken by the -writer. At this point a more detailed 
examinat ion of Soviet policy toward Austria is indicated, in order to 
point out t he changes helping to create a situation in which Soviet 
withdraw al from Austria became possible. 
The Soviet policy in Austria had two distinct features. One 
approach was direct . Soviet actions in the area concerned, an approach 
which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter VI. The other method 
was the use of the existing Austrian Connnunist Party. Through the Party 
the Russians were able to exercise indirect influence on the population 
and, what was even more important, they could get control over important 
government positions. 
One of the first actions of the Russians in Austria was the 
establishment of local administrations. These bodies were staffed with 
people "1ho were willing to carry out all Russian wishes. Members of the 
Austrian Communist Party (Kommunistische Partei Oesterreichs. KPOe for 
short) were naturally preferred, since they served the dual intention of 
the Russians. First, the Russians were assured that trustworthy 
individuals were in these positions, and second, it was a means of 
' 
strengthening the KPOe.1 Russian efficiency is seen in the fact that 
1The following two chapters are ma.inly based on Adolf Schaerf, 
Oesterreichs Erneuerung, ~-~ (Wien: Verlag der Wiener Volks-
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within a few weeks after the Soviets had entered Vienna, 16 out of the 21 
districts in the city had CoDID1unist police chiefs. 2 When the provisional 
Renner government was established, the Soviets succeeded in securing the 
Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of F.ducation, Public Information 
and Religious Affairs for leading Austrian Communists. Franz Honner 
became the Minister of Interior, giving him control of the Austrian 
police forces, an extremely important position for a future Communist 
take-over. Ernst Fischer, another high ranking member of the KPOe, was put 
in charge of the other Ministry 'Which provided him and the KPOe with all 
the important tools of propaganda such as radio and press.3 Thus the 
ground was well prepared for future action.4 
In the struggle for a new constitution, which finally led to the 
adoption of the 1929 version, Koplenig, a KPOe representative in 
Parliament said: 11Die Schaffung einer w.hren VoJ.ksdemokratie ist eine 
weitere Voraussetzung dafuer, dass sich die Geschichte der letzten Jahre 
buchhandlung, 1956 ); and William L. Stearman, The Soviet Union~ the 
OccuDati. on of Aust ria (Wien: Verlag fuer Zeitarchieve, 1957). 
2st earma.n, 212• git., p. 57. 
3The preparations for the successful coup d'etat in Czechoslovakia 
i nclu ded among other things the infiltration of the police forces with 
Comnrunist elements; the attainment of important Cabinet positions such as 
the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Information; the control of 
the administrations on the local, district and regional levels; and the 
control of mass organizations such as trade unions or youth groups. 
Dana A. Schmidt, "The Communist Coup d'Etat, 11 Problems in International 
Rel ations, Andrew Gyorgy and H. S. Gibbs, editors . (Englewood Cliffs: 
Prentice Hall, Inc., 1962), pp. 19-31. 
4Dr. Schaerf maint~ns that under the protection of the Russians 
an Austrian exile government was being set up in Yugoslavia. 
Schaerf, .!m• cit., p. 29. 
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nicht noch einmal wiederholen kann. 115 This statement left no doubt about 
the future plans for Austria. 
Government posts, although extremely important, were not the sole 
means for achieving the Communist aims. The KPOe attempted to create 
popular support through the formation of mass organizations. In other 
countries under Russian occupation the Communist parties relied heavily 
on the trade unions. In Austria, however, their efforts were frustrated 
in this respect. There "Wa.S very close cooperation betweoo. the trade 
unions and the Austrian Socialist Party. The KPOe attempted to organize 
the workers in the factories. This move -was counteracted by the formation 
of socialist fractions of the Oesterreichische Gewerkschaftsbund 
(Austrian Trade Union Association) in the enterprises concerned, and this 
tactic prevented the KPOe from getting control over the trade unions and 
6 the workers. 
Yet the KPOe was by no means troubled by these developments. Its 
optimism was enormous. In a Communist meeting at the Kosmoskino in 
Vienna on October 26, 1945, Ernst Fischer expressed the opinion that by 
May 1, 1946, the two workers' parties would be united. 7 But this was not 
the only grave miscalculation. The KPOe expected to 'Win 25 to 30 per cent 
of the votes in the upcoming elections, a point already indicated at an 
earlier part of this thesis. 
5The creation of a true people's democracy is another safeguard 
against a repetition of the events of the last years. (Writer's 
translation). Schaerf, ~- cit., p. 53. 
6Ibid., p. 75. 
7 
Ibid., p. 76. 
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The large-scale defeat of the KPOe in the first elections was in 
the writer 1 s opinion one of the most decisive events in Austria's 
struggle for freedom. This was a severe and perhaps fatal blow to Soviet 
plans for Austria. Five per cent of the votes were not enough to retain 
the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of F.ducation, Public Information 
and Religious Affairs. The KPOe had lost control over the most important 
agencies of government. It now had to change its tactics and look for 
new methods to achieve its aims. The KPOe still retained four seats in 
Parliament and even got one Cabinet post, the Ministry of Power and 
Electrification; but the important channels of influence had been cut off. 8 
The Austrian Socialist Party and the Austrian People 1s Party made 
most of their chance to diminish Communist influence wherever possible. 
The expected union between the Socialist Party and the Communist Party 
naturally did not materialize. Oskar Helmer, a Socialist, became the new 
Minister of Interior. He faced the monumental task of purging the 
police forces, in particular the Vienna police, of Communist elements. 
In order to fully understand the difficulty and importance of this task, 
a bri ef re view of earlier events will be necessary. 
When the Soviets entered Austria, Austria was without an 
effective police force. The Russians immediately established a new 
police force by very carefully filling important positions with loyal 
Communists. A Communist publication of 1945 gives evidence of this facta 
" . . . and in the police forces it was again the Communists who were in 
charge of the difficult and unrewarding task of the reconstruction in 
the first few months."9 The head of the Austrian police forces at that 
time was Dr. Duermayer, a high ranking member of the KPOe. This was the 
situation Minister Helmer had to face after he took office. The first 
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important step was to transfer Dr. Duermayer to Salzburg where he could 
do little harm. Dr. Duerijla.yer, however, preferred to resign. Joseph 
Holaubek, a Socialist, became the new head of the police forces. The 
Communists protested in vain against that move. The further elimination 
of Communists from the ranks of the police was a long and difficult task, 
and many obstacles had to be overcome. 10 Yet the Austrian government 
succeeded in accomplishing this important task and in creating a new and 
loyal Austrian police (see Table II). 
Thus the KPOe suffered one defeat after the other, while across 
the border the other Communist parties in Czechoslovakia and Hungary were 
very successful. These developments apparently convinced the KPOe that 
they had to resort to more drastic means in order to retain the favor of 
the Soviets. This was possibly one of the major motivations for their 
two attempts to overthrow the government by force. The first of these 
attempts took place in the spring of 1947. 11 
9schaerf, .QI2• ill•, p. 146. 
10stearman points out that the Soviets still exercised a great deal 
of control over the police forces in their zone. They opposed an increase 
in the police forces, had several training schools closed, and prohibited 
adequate arming of the forces. Stearman, .QI2• cit., p. 60. 
11This attempt took place at the same time as the Hungarian 
Communists successfully completed the government take-over in Hungary. 
On May 30, 1947, Premier Ference Nagy had to resign, and the Communist 
were in complete control. 
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On May 15, 1947, the KPOe organized a strike in Vienna. A large 
number of workers marched to the Ballhausplatz, _the seat of the Federal 
Chancellory, 'Where the Communist representatives in Parliament addressed 
the cro'Wd. Franz Honner said among other thingsa 11If the government in 
its present composition is not able to realize the seriousness of the 
situation, then it simply will have to be dissolvea. 1112 
This speech left very little doubt about the intentions of the 
KPOe. However, the Communists did not have enough popular support. Only 
minor incidents took place and the putsch had to be written off as a 
failure. Dr. Schaerf points out several times that after this failure 
the relations between the Russians and the Austrian Communist Party did 
cool off markedly . The fact that the KPOe was not invited to participate 
in the newly formed Cominform (Communist Information Bureau) seems to 
substantiate this view. 13 
Yet the KPOe "Was not "Willing to admit its defeat. At a dinner party 
given by Kristovic Binder, Austrian People's Party, at the beginning of 
July 1947, Ernst Fischer promised generous Russian support for a new 
Communist-controlled government. He was also quick to point out that 
· otherwise the Soviet Union would not be willing to sign an Austrian 
treaty. In addition, he demarrled the removal of unpleasant government 
members such as Foreign Minister Gruber or Minister of Interior Helmer. 14 
12schaerf, ill2• cit., p. 162. 
13The Communist parties of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, 
Russia, Poland, France, Czechoslovakia and Italy were all represented. 
14 
lifil! ~ Times, June 8, 1947. 
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This offer caused considerable concern in view of the developments 
in Hungary and other satellite countries. Although the KPOe succeeded in 
causing much unrest in government circles and among the people, the firm 
rejection of any such offer by the two coalition parties, the Austrian 
Socialist Party and the Austrian People's Party, soon restored internal 
stability. 15 
Then Austria decided to participate in the Marshall Plan. The KPOe 
could not prevent Austria from signing this agreement (lolhich was openly 
rejected by the Soviet Union), and its member resigned from the 
government in protest. In 1950 the KPOe ma.de a last desperate attempt to 
bring about a change in the government by force. It very skillfully 
exploited the existing unrest among the workers about the new Lohn-und 
Preisabkommen (Wage and Price Agreement) by demanding a much greater 
increase in -wages than was provided for by the new agreement . 
The strike started on September 26, 1950. Strikers blocked the 
traffic in Vienna. Some non-Communist workers joined the strike. The 
pro-Nazi Independents League openly aided the KPOe.16 On September 29, 
the KPOa suddenly called off the strike. On September 30, a Communist-
sponsored meeting of the All-Austrian Shop Stewards Conference took 
place, and an ultimatum -was submitted to the Austrian government. The 
Austrian government rejected the ultimatum, and on October 3, 1950, a 
15Schaerf, .QJ'.2• cit., pp. 163-170. 
16In connection with this strike the US High Commissioner Lieut. 
Gen. Geoffrey Keyes ~aised a number of charges against the Soviet Union 
for aiding the strikers. Among those charges were: Soviet army trucks had 
brought workers into the city; Soviet interference 'With the actions of the 
Austrian police, e.g. in Sankt Poelten where employees of the Soviet 
controlled enterprises had occupied the railroad plants. ~ York Times. 
September 30, 1950. 
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general strike was proclaimed. In the begimling a fairly large number of 
workers in Upper Austria, Styria, Lower Austria and Vienna participated. 
There was, however, hardly any violent action in the Western provinces. 
The Austrian Trade Union Association and the Austrian government con-
tinually appealed to the strikers not to follow the Communist strike 
appeal. In the Western provinces the political nature of the strike was 
soon realized and the workers started to go back to work. On October 4, 
1950, it had become clear that the strike wa.s a complete failure in the 
We0ter n zones. It was only in the Russian zone that the strike had a 
t emporary success, due to some local Russian support. Anne O'Hare 
McCormick of the~~ Times gave an account of the actions in Lower 
Austria and Vienna. 
In a few centers in the Russian zone of Lower Austria the post and 
telegraph offices were occupied and workers were driven out of 
factories by Communist terrorists with the tacit connivance of the 
Russian authorities •••• In the tenth district of Vienna 400 
Communists seated themselves on rails. The Russians prevented police 
forces from interfering. Suddenly four truck loads of building 
workers arrived and chased them away.17 
Stearman also points out the important role of the flying squads of the 
Austrian Trade Union Association which were of great help in figh~ing the 
Communist workers. 18 
' . 
Because of a serious incident in Wiener Neustadt, where the Soviets 
did not allow Austrian police forces to intervene and reoccupy a post 
office held by the Communist strikers, the Austrian government appealed to 
th e Allied Council to stop Russian interference. American and British troops 
17New X2r.k Times, October 5, 1950. 
18stearman, .QR• cit., p. 123. 
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were on alert and were equipped with huge rolls of barbed wire in order to 
assist the Austrian police if necessa.ry. 19 It was not necessary. On 
October 5, 1950, the Presidium of the All-Austrian Shop Stewards Conference 
called off the strike. The KPOe had suffered another big setback. William 
Stearman in commentin!I on the strike wrotes "The excesses 'Which took place 
during these strikes, senseless sabotage acts ••• , severely damaged 
the Conununist chances beyond repair. 1120. 
From that time on until 1955 the KPOe no longer presented any real 
danger to the Austrian government. All these failures had discredited the 
KPOe not only in the eyes of the Austrian population, but also in the 
eyes of the Russian occupation forces. This latter assumption might very 
well explain why the Russians ceased to render any important assistance 
to the KPOe during the last abortive uutsch in 1950. 
19New York Times, October 5, 1950. 
20stearman, QQ• cit., p. 124. 
VI 
SOVIET TECHNIQUES IN AUSTRIA 
The Austrian Communist Party was without doubt one of the main tools 
for the implementation of Soviet policy in Austria. Yet, as has already 
been pointed out, the Russians tried to pursue their aims not only through 
the Communist Party but also by other means. In many cases they took the 
necessary steps themselves. Direct Soviet interference, or often the mere 
threat of interference, posed a serious danger with which the Austrian 
government had to reckon at all times. 
When comparing the situation in Austria with the situation in the 
satellite countries, one has to remember a significant difference. Russia 
was not the only occupation power in Austria. She had to share her power in 
the Allied Council with the other Western Allies, a fact which proved to be 
of great importance after the second Control Agreement. 1 Yet despite that, 
' 
her policy was very successful, particularly in the Eastern zone. 
The Soviets, undoubtedly, were most successful in their handling of 
the question of German assets in Austria. The rather vague clause in the 
Potsdam Agreement concerning German assets 2 proved to be a perfect tool for 
the Russians. 
When they entered Austria they immediately occupied the oil fields 
in the north of Vienna (the second largest in Europe). A large portion of 
the machinery was "exported" to the East.3 In Augui;it 1945, the Soviet 
1see Chapter l, P• 9. 
3In 1947 in a study undertaken by the Oesterreichische Industriellen-
verband (Association of Austrian Industrialists) the replacement value of 
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government claimed all rights of production and exploration in Eastern 
Austria under the German assets clause of the Potsdam Agreement. This 
resulted in strong protests from the Austrian government and the Western 
Allies. The Western Allies maintained that this action constituted a 
violation of the 1943 Declaration Regarding Forced Transfer of Property 
in Enemy Controlled Territory.4 
The Soviets then approached the issue from a slightly different 
angle. They proposed the formation of an Austro-Soviet oil company for the 
joint management of the oil industry. 5 This plan was modelled after the 
Rumanian-Soviet economic agreement of May 8, 1945. The Soviet contribution 
to this joint undertaking was to consist in the Ge:nnan assets located in 
the area under discussion, while Austria -was supposed to grant the 
Rus si ans t he e.~ploration rights in the whole of Austria for a period of 
sixt y yea rs . The capital value of the Russian contribution was estimated 
at ,2 bil lion dollars; the Austrian contribution only at 500,000 dollars. 
The re st of about 13 billion dollars was to be paid by the Austrian 
gover nment within a period of five years. The whole company was to be 
placed under a Russian Director-General. No Austrian official was to hold a 
the machinery removed by the Russians from Austria was estimated at about 
1 billion dollars. William L. Stearman,~ Soviet Union .fil!9. ~ 
Occupation of Austria (Wien: Verlag fuer Zeitarchieve, 1957), p. 48. 
4This Declaration regarded as non-valid any transfer of property 
ri ghts which had been effected by open blunder or by transactions under 
duress even when these were apparently legal in form. Since most of the 
properties now claimed by the Russians did not constitute German assets 
under the meaning of the above Declaration, the Soviets actually took 
Austrian pr oper ty. Department of State, The Austrian State Tre aty (An 
Account of Postwar Negotiations Together with the Text of the Treaty 
and related Documents. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1957), P• 6. 
5Adolf Schaerf, Oesterreichs Erneuerung, 1.21i:2.-12il (Wiens Verlag 
der Wiener Volksbuchhandlung, 1956), PP• 64-65. 
comparable position.6 
These conditions were ridiculous. Dr. Schaerf describes this plan 
very adequately: 11Der Vertrag erschien mir als Musterbeispiel einer 
'soci e tas l eonina', einer Gesellschaft, in welcher der eine nur Rechte 
und der andere nur Pflichten hat. 117 Naturally, the Austrian Communists 
supported the plan wholeheartedly. 
Looking back now on that time, one can easily see the dangers 
which lurked below the surface. The realization of the plan would have 
meant almost complete economic dependence on Russia. On the basis of 
this agreement the Russians would have been able to penetrate the entire 
Austrian economy, thus extending their influence also to the Western 
zones. In addition, Austria would have never been able to raise the 
required 13 billion dollars. The Western powers certainly would not have 
provided Austria with the necessary capital to establish this Austro-
Soviet company. Tne only other possibility would have been to get the 
money from the Russians which would have made Austria even more dependent 
on the good will of the Soviet Union. 
The Austrian government, however, rejected the proposed agreement, 
and probably prevented thereby a future split of the country into East 
and West Austria. Yet this was only the beginning of the economic 
exploitation by the Russians. On July 6, 1947 , General Kurassov issued an 1 
order to the effect that all German property in the Russian zone would be 
6Ibid., p. 65. 
7 11This agreement was in my opinion an excellent example of a 
'societas leonina', an · agreement where one party has only rights while 
the other one has onlyduties.11 Ibid. 
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t r ansfe r r ed into Russian O'W11ership.8 In the execution of this order the 
Red Army occupied the enterprises concerned and placed them under Soviet 
contr ol. The capital was handed over to the recently established Russian 
St a t.e Bank . 9 
On July 1 o, 1946, the Austrian Parliament firmly rejected the Soviet · 
claims . The issue was brought up several times at the meetings of the 
Allied Council. The Russians presented an official definition of the 
German assets. The Western Powers refused to accept it and insisted on the 
definition laid down by the London Declaration of 1943. It was impossible 
to reach an agreement on this point. 10 
In the meantime the Austrian government had passed the 
Nationalization Act of July 26, 1946. Thia Act met with vigorous 
opposition from the Soviet Union, since it extended to a number of enter-
prises seized by the Russian occupation forces. The Soviet attempts to 
have the Act vetoed by the Allied Council were frustrated by Western 
opposition. The Russians resorted to a different technique. At the Allied 
Council meeting on August 20, 1946, the Soviets maintained that the 
Nationalization Act was a constitutional law and as such required the 
unanimous approval of the Allied Council before entering into force. This 
proposition was also rejected by the Western Powers. 11 When all these moves 
8 .6 Stearman, .Q;Q.. cit. , p. 4 • 
9schaerf, QQ.• cit., p. 118. 
10 In order to realize fully how disastrous this move was to the 
Austrian economy see Table III on the percentage of German ownership of 
Austrian corporations. 
11The US member of the Allied Council said in this connection: 
" • • • ,;mat did the Soviet government think they were signing when they 
failed the Russians fell back on an earlier statement of their 
representative to the Allied Councils 
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The Soviet command on the basis of Article 2(d) of the Control 
Agreement of June 28, 1946, reserves the right in the Zone of Austria 
controlled by it to take such action to safeguard the interest of the 
Soviet Union as it may consider necessary.12 
This meant, in other words, that the Soviets refused to apply the 
provisions of the Nationalization Act in their zone of occupation. 
The Soviets now proceeded to set up their oYn administration of the 
seized enterprises. They established the Upravlenye Soyietskovo 
Imushchestva y Avstrii (.Administration for Soviet Property in Austria), 
USIA for short. 13 They had their own bank, the Soviet State Bank, which 
granted loans with very high interest rates to these enterprises, making 
them even more dependent on the Russians. They also set up the Soviet 
Mineral Oil Administration. 14 
Aside from depriving Austria of the benefits of her entire oil 
resources and from taking a large part of the industry out of her economy, 
the USIA enterprises had some other very harmful - effects upon the Aust r ian 
economic life. Protected by their Russian administrators, they refused to 
pay truces and social insurance contributions. This meant, on the one hand, 
signed this new Control Agreement, that is in connection with the 
constitutional law? Just what did you think a constitutional law was when 
you signed it for your Government? I knew exactly what I was doing when 
I signed it for my Government." United States Forces in Austria, Report 
.Q.f th e Uni te d States High Connnissioner . (Washington: United States Forces, 
August 1946), p. 12 • . 
12 
. Ibid • , p. 8. · 
13m 1954 there were about 324 USIA enterprises in Austria 
employing 46,780 workers. Schaerf, .Ql?.• cit., p. 121. 
14stearma.n, .Ql?.• cit., pp. 52-53. 
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that the Austrian government lost part of the desperately needed income. 
On the ot her hand, it enabled the USIA retail stores, which were 
established between 1950 and 1952, to sell far below the established 
price (10 to 50 per cent). 15 This was undoubtedly an attempt to undermine 
th e Aust ri an economy. At that time it was difficult even for a very good 
patr i ot to buy the more expensive goods of Austrian stores. 
These enterprises, however, represented not only an economic but 
als o a political danger. All these enterprises had a small private a:rrrry, 
the Werkschutz , a paramilitary organization consisting of about 2,000 
members in the Russian zone. These members were mostly Austrian Communists, 
but some of them came from other countries. 16 It is important to point out 
here that these paramilitary organizations were of decisive importance 
during the Communist take-over in Czechoslovakia. ·Despite continuous 
efforts to solve the question of the German assets in Austria herself, as 
well as at the international conference table, Austria had to live with 
the USIA enterprises until the signing of the State Treaty in 1955. 
To give a more complete picture of the Russian methods in Austria 
it will be helpful to briefly discuss some ot he r Russian tactics. From 
t he very beginning of the occupation the Russians were in control of the 
Austrian communications system. They had occupied the Telephone and 
Tel egra ph Exchange at the Schillerplatz in the first district of Vienna. 
Alth ough the Western Allies were entitled to equal access, the Russians 
15JM£..' p. 54. 
16schaerf, .QJ2.• cit., p. 121. 
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managed to keep the control largely in their ow hands. It was not until 
the latter half of 1953 that some of the censorship exercised by the 
Russians during all these years was abolished. 
With similar efficiency the Russians controlled the press. Their 
interpretation of the Press Decree issued by the Allied Council on 
October 11, 1945, 17 enabled them to suppress any anti-Soviet propaganda. 
In the Allied Council meeting on July 11, 1952, it was pointed out that 
since the beginning of that year 103 papers had been banned; 111 book 
titles permanently banned; and 3012 books seized in the mails by the 
Soviet censors. 18 
Aoouctions and midnight arrests represented another integral part 
of the Soviet tactics. The Russians not only arrested people in their 
zone, but they also arrested them in Western zones or the Western sectors 
in Vienna. In many cases they went so far as to arrest high ranking 
government officials such as Oberinspektor Anton Marek, a leading 
Austrian police officer. 19 These actions led t? numerous protests by the 
Allies and the Austrian government with very little effect. The Russians 
either denied the charges or refused to answer at all. This part of the 
Soviet technique served at least two purposes. First, aoouctions were a 
useful means to remove certain unpleasant persons from places were they 
might cause trouble or frustrate Soviet aims. Second, these aoouctions 
could not fail to have the desired psychological effect upon the 
popul ati on . Fear and uncertainty on part of the population led to a 
17stearman, .QI?.• ill•, P• 73. 
18Ibid., p. 74. 19Ibid., p. 65. 
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gre ate r will ingn ess of the people to submit to Soviet rule. 
All t hese techniques, as wel l as others, were used with varying 
suc cess by th e Soviet forces to intimidate the population and to get 
control over t he Austrian government. It was not until 1953 that some of 
the se pra cti ces were discontinued, and the situation improved to any 
noti ceabl e degree. 
VII 
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AFTER STALIN 
The foreign policy of a country is an integral part of the overall 
policy of the government. Internal events often shape the course of 
international developments. A country's foreign policy, furthermore, is 
not conducted in a vacuum. The international situation to which the 
country concerned has to respond is just as important in determining the 
foreign policy as are the developments in the domestic field. Important 
changes 'Within the country will have their effects on its international 
relations, in the same way as significant changes in the international 
field might necessitate a re-evaluation of the country's foreign policy. 
It is, therefore, important to consider the Austrian question not as an 
isolated issue, but to see it in relation to other international events. 
At the same time it is necessary to examine how the changes in the Soviet 
le aders hip affected Soviet foreign policy. 
A br ie f di scussion of the Soviet aims in Austria prior to Stalin's 
dE:ath will provide the background for an understanding of the events 
afte r 1953. The main emphasis, however, will be put on the international 
situat ion at the time of Stalin's death and developments thereafter . It 
is important to understand the close connection between the Austrian 
question and some of the other international problems which were awaiting 
solution at that time. Only against the background of developments in the 
European theater and in Russia herself can one understand Soviet policy 
toward Austria. 
I. SOVIET AIMS IN AUSTRIA 
In 1945 all the evidence indicates that the Russians envisaged 
Aust ria as another Soviet satellite. The actions of the Soviet 
occupation forces after their entry into Austria--getting control of the 
J 
Austrian police forces or putting Austrian Communists in leading 
government positions such as the Ministry of Education, Public Information 
and Religious Affairs and the Ministry of Interior--all point in this 
direction. Similar actions were taken in other Russian-occupied countries, 
as in Czechoslovakia, where they finally led to a successful overthrow 
of the government (see Chapter V, p. 36). 
The election defeat of 1945 shattered these hopes. Stalin could no 
longer expect to bring the whole of Austria behind the Iron Curtain. The 
Russia,.~ policy after 1945, however, points to the fact that the Soviet 
Union had no intention of withdrawing from Austria. The measures in the 
economic field, the .harassments, abductions and arrests, the interference 
with actions of the local police, are all testimony to the fact that the 
Soviet Union's tight grip over the Eastern zone of Austria was by no 
means loosened. These measures justify the assumption that the Soviet 
Union was trying to make at least the Eastern part of Austria part of her 
satellite empire . This policy, as is well know, was very successful in 
Germany. German unification is still one of the big unsolved problems in 
Europe. 
The main reason why a similar policy did not succeed in Austria can 
again be found in the developments after the 1945 elections. Contrary to 
the situation in Germany where two separate governments were established, 
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one for the Western zones and one for the Eastern zone, the whole of 
Austr ia was governe d from Vienna. On the basis of the 1945 elections 
Au3t ria was unified at least on the government level. All laws were 
applicable in all the zones. True, the Soviet Union frustrated the law 
enf orcement in many cases in their zone, for instance the Nationalization 
Act, but the main instrument of Soviet policy--the Communist puppet 
regime--was absent. 'lnus Soviet activities were severely limited and 
bound to fail in the long run. The two abortive attempts by the Austrian 
Communist Party to overthrow the government by violence and force and to 
establish a true people's democracy were other setbacks which made it 
even more difficult to realize the Russian aims. Yet Stalin was not 
willing to admit defeat, and he resorted to delaying tactics in the 
negotiations for an Austrian treaty. 
In order to better understand the Soviet policy toward Austria in 
t he last few years before the signing of the Austrian State Treaty, it 
is ne cessary to look at the international situation in the early 50 1 s, 
and to give an account of the developments 'Which helped to shape Russian 
fore ign policy in these years. 
II. SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AFTER STALIN 
~nough the Soviets had succeeded in establishing a protective belt 
of sa tel lites by 1950, characterized by large-scale economic, political 
a.~d social integration with the Soviet Union, Russian foreign policy had 
suffered major setbacks in other areas. The Berlin blockade proved to be 
a failur e due to immediate and firm intervention by the Western Allies; 
the support of the Greek guerilla fighters through the Balkan 
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allies 1 resulted in American aid under the Truman Doctrine; and the 
Russian attempt to make Yugoslavia into a satellite after the pattern of 
the other satellite countries failed due to Marshall Tito's resistance. 
It led, on the contrary, to a severe rift within the Communist bloo. 2 At 
the time of the 19th Party Congress in Moscow the situation of the other 
Communist parties in Europe had by no means improved. Only in Italy was 
an in crease in membership recorded. In Great Britain membership had dropped 
f r om 45,000 to 33,000; in France from 907,000 to 506,000; in Demna.rk from 
45, 000 to 16,000; in Norway from 40,000 to 7,000; and in Switzerland, 
Sweden and Holland the membership decreased by 50 per cent.3 
The existing international situation called for a reappraisal of 
Soviet fo reign policy. Direct military actions had failed to bring the 
desired results. Now the Soviet Union had to resort to new tactics, slow 
pressure upon non-Communist countries or delaying tactics. It is in this 
change in tactics that an explanation can be found for the stalemate in 
t he negotiations on the German and Austrian treaties. The Korean War 
might be another explanation for the lack of initiative in the West. 
Russia was probably more concerned with problems in the Far East than 
1J. M. Mackintosh, Strategy and Tactics .Qf Soviet .Foreign Policy 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 27. 
2Tb.e rift between Moscow and Belgrad in 1948 was ma.inly based on 
the rivalry between the two countries. Tito's plan of a Balkan Federation 
was a direct challenge to the predominant position of the Soviet Union in 
this ar ea. The independent course of Yugoslavia led to the expulsion of 
the Yugoslav Communist Party from the Cominform. It was not until after 
Stalin's death that relations improved again. 
31-1ackintosh, .Qn• ill•, p. 70. 
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i.dth a speedy settlement of the German and Austrian questions. 
Stalin's death on March 5, 1953, was decisive in as much as it 
opened new possibilities for Soviet foreign policy. After Stalin's death 
a gr oup of new leaders appeared. Individual leadership was replaced by 
collective leadership.4 The transition was not effected i.dthout a 
struggle for power. Beria was charged i.dth attempting to overthrow the 
government, was tried and later on executed. On March 25., 1953, 
Khrushchev succeeded Malenkov to the position of the first secretary of 
5 the Communist party. 
As already indicated Soviet foreign policy was stagnant at Stalin's 
death. The negotiations on Germany and Austria were deadlocked. Russia's 
participation in the United Nations technical organizations was minimal. 
The contacts ,nth Greece and Yugoslavia had almost ceased to exist. As 
Mr. Mackintosh observes, Russia was so "isolated that it was practically 
4The new leadership consisted of G. M. Malenkov who was premier 
and first secretary of the Communist party, and L. P. Beria, V.M. Molotov, 
N. A. Bulganin and L.M. Kaganovich all deputy premiers. Ibid., p. 72. 
110ne of the fundamental principles of party leadership is 
collectivity in deciding all important problems of party work. No matter 
how experienced leaders may be, no matter what their knowledge and 
ability, they do not possess and they cannot replace the initiative and 
experience of a whole collective." Pravda as cited in Current Digest Qi 
the Soviet Press, Vol. V, No. 13, p. 3. 
511A plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union held March 14, 1953, adopted the following resolution: 
1. to grant the request of Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers 
Comrade G. M. Malenkov to be released from the duties of Secretary of the 
Party Central Committee; 2. to elect the following Secretariat of the 
Party Central Committee: Comrades N. s. Khrushchev, M.A. Suslov, P. N. 
Pospelov, N. N. Shatalin and S. D. Ignatyev. 11 Pravda and Izvestia in the 
Current Digest Q1: the Soviet Press, Vol. V, No. 8, p. 12. 
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impossi ble to have a positive policy in international affairs. 116 
The new leaders were interested in restoring some of the contacts 
in order to decrease international tensions during the period of internal 
consolidation. 7 Several moves point in this direction. After a collision 
between British and Soviet aircrafts over the Soviet zone of Germany, the 
Russians suggested a conference on air safety over Germany. For another 
thing, having opposed Dag Harm:narskjold's appointment as Secretary-General 
of th e United Nations for a long time, the Soviet Union now gave her 
consent. Diplomatic relations were resumed with Israel. The attacks on 
Yugosl avia decreased, and in June the Soviet government proposed the 
r e- est ablishment of full diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia. The 
relati ons between Turkey and the Soviet Union too witnessed a marked 
i mpr ovement. Pravda reported on July 19, 1953: 
In t he name of preserving good neighborly relations and 
st r engthening peace and security, the Governments of Georgia and 
Ar meni a ha$e found i t possible to renounce their territorial claims 
on Turkey. , • 
Thi s political thaw also extended to the Far East. For the first 
ti me the Soviet Union agreed to voluntary repatriation of prisoners of 
war in Kqrea, a proposal 'Which she had rejected until that time. The 
6Mackintosh, QI?.• ill•, p. 74. 
7During all these months i mportant chan ges took place in the 
government s of the Ukraine Republic, Belorussian Republic, Armenian 
Republic, Georgian Republic or Azerbaidzhan Republic, to mention only 
a f ew. These reforms consisted mainly in bringing in new men or in 
amalgamating ministries. 
8 
Curren t Digest .Qf the Soviet~' Vol. V, No. 29. pp. 21-22. 
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exchange of wounded and sick prisoners of war started on April 20, 1953.9 
On July 27, 1953, the Korean Armistice was signed. 
The improvement in the international climate was paralleled by 
similar conciliatory measures of the Russians within Austria. On June 7, 
Pravda and Izvestia reported: 
The USSR Council of Ministers has pronounced it no longer 
expedient to combine in one person the functions of USSR High 
Commissioner in Austria and Commander in Chief of the Soviet forces. 
Therefore the Commander in Chief has been relieved of his duties as 
High Commissioner and his activity restricted to command of Soviet 
forces in Austria. 
Ambassador I. I. Ilyichev has been appointed USSR High 
Commissioner in Austria.10 
This was followed by an announcement that the Soviet Union and the 
Austrian government had agreed to give their diplomatic representations 
embassy status. Certain other alleviations were granted. Austria was 
allowed to have air mail communications with the German Democratic 
Republic, the West German Republic and Japan.11 
On July JO, ,1953, the USSR High Commissioner in Austria 
I. I. Ilyichev sent a note to the Austrian government indicating that 
from then on the Soviet Union would pay her ov1n costs for the occupation 
forces: 
In connection with the desire expressed by the Austrian 
government, the USSR government deems it possible, starting 
August 1, 1953, to take over all expenses connected with maintaining 
Soviet occupation forces in Austria, and thus to free the Austrian 
state budget of these expenses.12 
9David J. Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin (New York: 
J.B. Lippincott Company, 1961), 126. 
10current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. V, No. 23, p. 20. 
11 Ibid • , No. 24, p. 1 2. 12 Ibid • , No. 31 , p. 1 7. 
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In the meeting of the Allied Council in Austria on August 14, it 
ms decided to end quadripartite censorship in Austria. In another Allied 
Council meeting on Ausgust 28, 1953, all control over communication was 
-
abolished as of September 1, 1953. This meant that postal, telegraph and 
t el ephone, as well as radio communications were again under Austrian 
control. 
Yet despite these alleviations within Austria, the Soviet Union 
did not make any concessions on the basic issue of the Austrian treaty. 
In fact, she fell back on the old argument that she was not going to 
discuss the "abbreviated treaty. 1113 T'ne demand for withdrawal of this 
version of the treaty was repeated until the Western Allies did comply 
with the Russian demand. The Soviet Union also continued to accuse 
Austria in the Allied Council of engaging in militarist activities and of 
not carrying out the demanded denazification. Statements on Austria were 
very vague and non-committal, but at least they were not 'Wholly negative. 
An observation of Foreign Minister Molot ov may serve as an illustration. 
As regards the Austrian treaty, the Soviet Union considered and 
considers that here also there are no questions which cannot be 
solved on the basis of previously achieved understanding, given the 
effecti 1$ observance of the democratic rights of the Austrian people. 4 
13The "abbreviated treaty" does not provide for any decision which 
could facilitate restoration of a truely independent democratic Austrian 
state. At the same time it leaves the door open for restoration of a 
fascist regime and the transformation of Austria into a satellite of the 
American aggress ors. The "abbreviated treaty" also completely ignores the 
Potsdam decision on the transfer to the Soviet Union of German assets in 
East Austria , an omission Yhich is clearly directed against the Soviet 
Union. Prav da and Izvestia. Ibid., No • .3, p. 18. 
14Ibid., No • . 20, P• 7. 
One might ask at thi s point why the Soviets despite all these 
conciliatory moves, continued to procrastinate on the German and Austrian 
treaties? Three possible explanations of the seeming dichotomy in Russian 
foreign policy suggest themselves at that time. First, there is ample 
evide nce that t he Russians were preoccupied with internal affairs such as 
t he re organization of the governments in the various republics. The 
out-ward unity of the Soviet bloc showed very serious cracks. The Soviet 
control over the satellite countries was challenged by the June revolt in 
East Berlin, which spread all over East Germany and -was crushed by the 
Sovie t t roops with brutal force. Yugoslavia's independent course defied 
al l Sovi et attempts to bring that country under their power. In order to 
be able t o cope with these internal proble ms, a temporary truce on the 
in t ernati onal scene -was more than desirable . This truce -was obtained by 
some of th e above mentioned steps to reduce .international tension. Since 
internal developme.~ts required the full attention of Russia, maintenance 
of th e sta tus quo in the negotiations on the Austrian and German peace 
t r eaties would only be advantageous. The second reason for the 
maint enance of the status quo in Europe might be a very simple one. No 
one doubt s that settlement of Austrian and German questions was 
pr obably one of the most difficult international problems. The stalemate 
in t he negotiations on the treaties during the last few years of Stalin's 
rule support this fact. These two questions involved the vital interests 
of t he East and the West. It is, therefore, a credible assumption that 
the new regime simply did not have a new and definite policy toward 
Aust r ia or Germany, and, therefore, took refuge in vague and non-
committal statements about both questions, yet still leaving the door 
open for future negotiations. Vyacheslav M. Molotov, the Russian expert 
in foreign policy at that time, might provide the third explanation. 
Molotov was a staunch believer in Stalinist principles, and one could 
hardly expect him to introduce major changes in Soviet foreign policy. 
According to Professor Dallin, Molotov was the only man in the new 
government who knew anything _about foreign policy, 'Which certainly gave 
him great influence. 
61 
One is justified then in drawing the conclusion that the seemingly 
conciliatory trends in the Soviet foreign policy were only superficial and 
designed to create a favorable international climate, 'While the 
uncompromising attitude and the delaying tactics of the Stalin era still 
lingered on. Professor Fainsod arrives at a similar conclusion:"On the 
international front, they (the Russians) have sought to preserve the 
gains which Stalin achieved, while pressing for a 1detente 1 in their 
relations with the free world. 11 15 
The Western Powers, encouraged particularly by the events in the 
Far Ea.st, tried to reopen the negotiations on the Gerina.n and Austrian 
treaties. The Soviets countered with a new move. In a note on August 4, 
1953, they linked the Austrian question with the question of Germany. "It 
stands to reason that possible progress in solving the German problem 
could also facilitate solution of the Austrian treaty. 1116 In addition, 
15Merle Fainsod, "The Soviet Union Since Stalin," Problems fil'.. 
Communis m (Washington: _United States Information Agency, Vol. 3, No. 2, 
1954), p. 10. 
16current Digest .Q1: ~ Soviet Press, .Vol. V, No. 35, p. 19. 
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th ey still demanded the withdrawal of the "abbreviated treaty. 11 The 
Western Powers finally agreed to withdraw the disputed treaty. The 
Austrian question continued to be one of the main subjects of the 
diploma.tic correspondence between the Soviet Union and the Western Allies. 
It is worth noting in this context the contradiction in the Soviet 
foreign policy. Russian politicians had indicated at several points that 
a solution of the Austrian question was not impossible. Yet they pro-
ceeded to link the Austrian question with the German settlement. The 
Russian attitude toward Germany, however, did not justify any optimistic 
assessment of the chances of an early settlement of the problem. 
Malenkov -was very outspoken about his attitude toward Germany in a speech 
given at a dinner party in the Kremlin on August 22, 1953: 11No disguise 
can hide the true aspirations of the Adenauer group which is the 
headquarter of militarism and revanchism in West Germany, and wich is 
leadin g Germany into a new war. 1117 It -was not until the separation of the 
Austrian and German questions in the spring of 1955 that the Austrian 
treaty became reality. 
On the basis of the above mentioned exchange of notes, the Soviet 
Union finally agreed to a four Power conference in order to decrease 
international tens io ns and to discuss the German and Austrian treaties: 
Bein g gui ded by the desire to cooperate in t he speedy settle ment 
of ur gent international problems, the Soviet government expresses 
its r eadin ess to take part in a meeting of the ministers of ~oreign 
affairs of the United States, the USSR, England and France. 1 
17Pr avda cited in Curr ent Di ges t of the Soviet Pre s s, Vol. V, 
No. 34, pp . 1-2. 
18New Worl d Revi ew, December 1953, p. 13. 
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The Berlin Conference of the Foreign Ministers proved to be a 
· 19 gr eat di sappointment for the Western Powers. The Western Powers and 
Aust ria were definitely overoptimistic with regard to this Conference. 
The Russ ians had not given any indication whatsoever that they would be 
wil ling t o make concessions on the Austrian or German questions. On the 
contr ary, t he events before the Berlin Conference, such as linking Austria 
with Ger nany, justified exactly the opposite assumption. Clearly, the 
Soviet Union came to the Berlin Conference with aims quite different 
from those of the Western Allies. To the Russians the Austrian and German 
t reaties were only of secondary importance. The main reason why the 
Russians came to the Conference was to get disarmament talks under way 
and to obtain the Chinese People's Republic's representation at the 
forthcoming Geneva Conference, which was to deal with the problems of 
Indochina and Korea. The Soviet Union achieved both ai ms, and the 
Conference was recorded by the Soviet press as a success for the Soviet 
Union. Pr avda pointed out on February 20, 1954, that the Berlin Conference 
made it possible to have a valuable exchange of opinion which helped to 
clarify the differences. The article hailed the fact that agr eement was 
re ached between the United States, France, Great Britain and the Soviet 
Union to take positive steps in the field of disarmament. Pr avda, 
furt her more, devoted considerable attention to the fact that the Allies 
had agreed to call t.he Geneva Conference which would 'Witness the 
19For further details see Chapter III, p. 28. 
participation of the Chinese People's Republic. 20 This article was 
f ollo wed by another on February 22, 1954, discussing the importance of 
' 
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the Chin ese People's Republic, and emphasizing the fact that China's 
par t ici pati on in negotiations dealing with difficult international 
prob ler .1s had become a necessity. 21 Izyestia followed the same line in an 
arti cle on February 28, 1954. 
The decision to hold the Geneva conference is convincing proof 
that th e rol e and importance of the Chinese People's Republic in 
in t ernational life can no longer be ignored. This decision implies 
virtual recognition of the Chinese People's Republic as a great 
po'Wer.22 
Very little attention was devoted in both papers to the Austrian 
and German questions. Pravda stated: "The Ministers 'Were unable to reach 
an agreement on these questions, but it goes without saying that they 
were not taken off the agenda. 1123 A second reference was ma.de to Austria, 
stressing again the connection between the Austrian and German 
settl ements. 
The aforementio ned Western plans for Germany, which intensify 
t he danger of a German militarist revival, · prevented settle ment of 
the Austrian question. Nonetheless the Soviet government reaffirmed 
i t s faith that t he possibility remains of settling the question in 
the very near future.24 
On th e basis of these articles the conclusion seems to be justified that 
th e Sovi ets had absolutely no intention of solving the German and Austrian 
questi ons at the Berlin Conference . 
20curren t Digest Qf. the Soviet Pre s s, Vol. VI, No. 4, P• .3. 
21 Ibid ., No. 8, p. 29. 22~., No. 9, P• 25. 
231m.g,., No. 4, p. .3 ~ 24I bid., p. 4. 
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The Soviet press now turned its attention to the forthcoming 
Geneva Conference. The United States was frequently attacked for helping 
to conti nue the strug gle in Indochina, and for planning aggression in 
ot her parts of Asia. 25 Russian fears that the United States might get 
direc tly involved in Indochina were not completely unfounded. Secretar<J 
of State Dulles had asked represent atives in Congress to support a 
r es ol ut i on to permit the Presid ent to use air and naval power in Indo-
china. His t heory was that if Indochina fell the United States might have 
t o ret rea t t o Hawaii. Western intervention was only prevented by the 
r ef usal of other Allies, in particular Great Britain, to support that 
actio n . The conference table was considered the more appropriate means 
for settling that dispute. 26 
On April 25, 1954, the Geneva Conference opened. Two issues were 
on the agenda: the problem of Korea and the problem of Indochina. While 
the Korean question could not be settled satisfactorily, an accord -was 
finally reached on Indochina. The war was ended and three states were 
created--La _os, Cambodia and Vietnam. Vietnam was divided, the northern 
part to remain under Communist dominance and the southern part to remain 
under Western influence until elections were held. The Soviet Union and 
the Chinese People's Republic undoubtedly played an important role in 
these negotiations. The Geneva accord was hailed at least as a partial 
suc ces s in the Soviet press. Pravda pointed out that the Geneva accord 
25 Ibi d ., No. 11 , p. 20. 
26chalmers M. Roberts, 11The Day We Didn't Go to War, 11 World in 
Crisis, Fred erick H. Hartmann, editor, second edition (New York: 
Macmillan Company, 1963), p. 241. 
had created favorable conditions for the settlement of other important 
unresolved international questions such as ending the arms race or 
guaranteein g collective security for all European states. 27 
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Already before the Geneva Confer ence the Soviet Union had to turn 
her atte ntion to Europe and in particular to Germany. A whole score of 
articles can be found in the Sovi et press denouncing German 
re militariza t ion and pointing to the necessity of collective European 
security. The Soviet Union naturally was strongly opposed to the European 
Defense Community (EDC), which would have provided for rearmament of West 
Germany. Various techniques wer~ used. German rearmament was depicted as a 
threat to Italy. The old German-French antagonism was exploited to prevent 
ratification of the treaty establishing t he EDC. 
The Soyiet Union, however, not only engage d in strong protests 
but also offered a counterproposal to t he EDC. On February 10, 1954, 
}1olotov submitted a draft for an all-Euro pean security treaty. 28 The 
United States and the Chinese People 1 s Republ ic were to be admitted as 
observers. This was clearly an attempt to defeat the EDC, which would 
hav e permitted German rearmament. Molotov more than once expressed the 
Russian opposition to German remilitariza t ion. In a note on March 31, 
1954, the Soviet Union proposed the abandonment of' the EDC, and urged 
the United States to join the all- European security system. Russia in 
return was willing to consider joining the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization. 11 ••• the USSR is prepared to consider jointly with the 
27cur r ent Digest of ~ Sovie t~' Vol. VI, No. 24, p. 1. 
28New York Times, February 11, 1954, p. 4. 
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governments concerned the participation of the USSR in the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization. 1129 This proposal, however, was rejected by the West 
as an attempt to block the EDC. The Russians continued their warnings 
against German rearmament. In a speech before the Supreme Soviet, Premier 
Ma.lenkov pointed out that"• •• the West German militarists are 
beginning to feel themselves in the saddle once more and increasingly, 
act not as a potentially aggressive force, but as a real threat to 
European security. 1130 
On July 24, 1954, the Soviet Union sent another note to the 
Wester n Allies proposing a conference of all European countries, 
t oget her with the United States and the Chinese People's Republic as 
obs er vers, to discuss European collective security. On August JO, 1954, 
the Fr ench National Assembly rejected the EDC by a vote of 319 to 264. 31 
The Sovi et press and Soviet officials hailed the rejection of the EDC. Yet 
t hei r j oy was shortlived. The Western powers innnediately started looking 
f o~ a substitute for the EDC. The extension of the Brussels Pact was 
r egarded as the best solution. The nine powers at the London conference 32 
agre ed on October 3, 1954, to revise the Brussels Pact and to include 
Germany and Italy. 33 This conference was followed by a nine-power 
29New World Review, April 1954, P• 11. 
JOibid., May 1954, P• 17. 
31New York Times, August 31, 1954. 
32united States, Canada, Great Britain, Belgium, Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, France, Italy and Germany. 
33New York Times, October 4, 1954. 
conference in Paris, which approved a protocol creating the Western 
European Union. 
The Soviet Union scored the London and Paris agreements and 
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charged the West with engagin g in aggression. In a note of November 13, 
1954, the Sovi et Union extended an invitation to all European countries 
with whom she had diplomatic relations and to the United States to attend 
a conference on European security in Moscow on November 29. Pravda -wrote 
with regard to the European security conference: 11Apparently, .American 
leaders think t hat the Soviet Union and other peace-loving European 
countries will passively watch tho forme.tion of a military bloc which 
includes West German militarists. 1134 The next developments proved that 
the Soviet Union was not passively watching. The meeting scheduled for 
November 29, took place despite the refusal of the Western countries to 
attend the conference. On December 2, 1954, a statement of the participants 
was issued to the effect that they were willing to participate in a 
European defense organization if the Paris agreements were abandoned. 35 
Should the Western Powers insist on these agreements, the Communist 
countries would form their own defense organization.3 6 This was not an 
empty threat. On May 14, 1955, the Warsaw Treaty, the Treaty of Friendship, 
Cooperation and Mutual Aid between the .Albanian People's Republic, 
Bulgarian People's Republic, Hungarian People's Republic, German Democratic 
34current Digest of~ Sovi et Press, Vol. VI, No. 46, p. 45 
350n1y the eight Communist countries of Eastern Europe and the 
Chinese People's Republic as an, observer participated in the conference. 
3%ckintosh, .Q.12• cit., p. 86. 
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Republic, Polish People's Republic, Rumanian People's Republic, Union of 
Soviet Soci alis t Republics and Czechoslovak Reptiblic, was concluded, the 
Communist counterpart to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.37 
A brief glan ce at developments with regard to the Austrian treaty 
shows that no progress was achieved in this field. On August 12, 1954, 
the Soviet government sent a note to the Austrian government stating: 
The Sovi et government considers, as before, that it is fully 
possible -to conclude a st ate tre aty aimed at restoring a free and 
independ ent Austrian state •••• In accordance with this, the 
Soviet government consents to holding a conference of Ambassadors 
of the USSR, France, Great Britain and the Unite d States in Vienna, 
wi th the participation of an Austrian representative, which would 
concern itself with examinin g the remaining unr es olved questions 
concerni ng the draft treaty with Austria ••• 38 
This note, however, did not lead to any meeting, and the Austrian 
question was put on the shelf until the sprin g of 1955. 
Once more it is necessary to turn attention to internal Soviet 
aff airs. Toward the end of 1954 and particularly at the beginning of 1955 
Malenkov's position appe ared to be less and less secure. The differences 
arose over economic policy, although there were several reasons for 
V.ialenkov's fall. Malenkov had repeatedly stre ss ed the importance of the 
consumer good indust r y: 
The urgent tas k lies in r aising sharply in two or three years the 
populati on 's supply of foodstuffs and manufactured goods, meat and 
meat product s, butter, sugar, confe ctionery, textiles, garments , 
footwear, ••• ; in raisi ng considerabl y the supply to the population 
of all articles of general consumption.J~ 
37~ York Times, May 15, 1955. 
J 8current Diges t of the Sovi et Press, Vol. VI, No. 46, p. 45. 
J9 Pra vda cited in New World Revi ew, September 1953, p. 6. 
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Khrushch ev, on the other hand, believed in the overriding importance of 
heavy in dus try. Professor Dallin's comment about the fall of Malenkov is: 
11The r ock on which the Malenkov ship went dow was heavy industry versus 
food and consumer goods. u40 
On February 8, 1955, Malenkov resigned, and was succeeded by 
Mars hal N. A. Bulganin who together with Khrushchev formed the new top 
leadership in Russia . It was only after Khrushchev had removed Malenkov 
that progress was achieved in the negotiations for the Austrian treaty. 
Although the Soviet Union was not willing to make any concessions on 
Germany, for rather obvious reasons, Molotov indicated in his speech 
on February 8, 1955, that the Austrian question might be solved in the 
near future.4 1 The opportunity was not bypassed by the Austrian 
government. Contacts were established immediately through traditional 
diplorr.atic channels. The initial discussions were followed by an 
invitation to th e Austrian government to send a delegation to Moscow for 
further discussi on of the issue. The invitation was gladly accepted and 
an Austrian government delegation went t o Moscow. In the negotiations 
between April 12 and April 15, it was agreed that Austria would be a 
neutral country after the pattern of Switzerland.4 2 The final points were 
settled at an Ambassadors' conference in Vienna; and on May 15, 1955, the 
40nallin, QQ• cit., p. 221. 
41For further details on the negot ia t i ons until May 15, 1955, see 
Chapter IV, pp . 29-34. 
42Dallin points out that Molotov first wanted a mutual assis tan ce 
pact bet ween Austria and the Soviet Union. Upon Austria's refusal Molotov 
agreed to Austria's neutrality following the Swiss example. 
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f our for ei gn ministers si gned t he Austrian State Treaty. 
An anal ysi s of t he events between 1945 and 1955 brings out t he aims 
and th e fa ilures of the Soviet pol i cy in Austria, and furnishes some of 
the r easons for th ese failures. The original aims of adding the Austrian 
st ate t o the sa tel lite empire43 had to give way to more modest plans. Yet 
even th es e mor e modest aspirations failed to become reality. The rising 
Western oppos i tion to further Communist expansion, the lack of popular 
support in Austria and the blunders and miscalculations of the Austrian 
Communi st Party necessitated a change in the original plans for Austria. 
Due to the inability of the Austrian Communists to get control of mass 
or ganizat i ons and to retain their positions in the Austrian government , 
the Russians had to fall back on their own resources. The essential 
instrument of Russian, or better, Communist tactics--the Communist-
controlled puppet regime-was lacking. Thus the Soviets could not pursue 
t heir policies behind the facade of legitimacy. No only did the Russians 
fail to establish a Communist puppet regime, but the government established 
after the 1945 elections had authority in the whole of Austria, and not 
j ust in t he Eastern zone or Western zones as was the case in Germany. It 
was a government which was by no means willing to retreat because of 
Soviet th reats. 
43In an interview Professor Ulam agreed with this conclusion. He 
asse r t ed t hat 11Austr i a too was on the ti me table. 11 He pointed out t hat 
St alin was a very cautio us and skillful politician in t he field of foreign 
poli cy, and was careful not to push t he West too far. This undoubted l y is 
one of t he reasons for the change in Soviet policy toward Austria. 
Dr. Ada~ B. Ula.m, of Harvard University, in an ·nterview, April,1965. 
Permi ssi on to quote secured. 
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In the last few years before Stalin's death the Soviet policy 
I 
toward Austria had reached a point where positive action was no longer 
possible without admitting defeat. As pointed out at the beginning of 
Chapter VII, Austria was not the only failure in Soviet foreign policy. 
Thus Stulin resorted to a policy which could be pursued without a loss of 
face--maintenance of the status quo. 
The question has often been asked why there ~as no marked change 
after Stalin 1 s death. Why did the new leadership not discard the old 
policy and take a more positive approach to the question of Austria? 
Chapter III has attempted to find some answers to , these questions. The 
answer is not a simple one; various elements have to be taken into 
consideration. 
First, one of the most important factors ib this respect is the 
element of continuity. The spectacular changes in leadership, which are 
usually surrounded by a great deal of mystery in the case of the Soviet 
Union, tend to camouflage the fact that despite these changes there is 
continuity. While the policy makers in the Soviet Union come and go, 
sometimes very unexpectedly, general Russian policy whether within the 
domestic or foreign spheres, follows the same broad course. Change 
certainly does take place in the policy pursued, but it is a slow, 
gradual modification. The changes in foreign policy after Stalin 1 s death 
and again in 1955 after Malenkov's resignation bear out the above 
statement. The conciliatory moves discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter VII were indications of a more 11liberal 11 Soviet foreign policy, 
but they do not justify the assumption that a radical reorientation took 
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place after Stalin's death. The Russian position on Austria and Germany 
and the attitude toward the West in general , in fact, show that the 
principles governing foreign policy under Stalin were taken over into the 
Malenkov era; they were modified, one might say "liberalized," but 
basically they w~re still Stalin's principles; · continuity was maintained. 
Second, a closer look at the developments after Stalin's death 
shows very clearly the interdependence of the various problems confronting 
the Soviet Union in international politics. It wohi d be a great mistake 
to see the solution of a question as an isolated event which has no 
connection with other problems. The Austrian and German treaties, more 
than any other issue, bear out this fact. How could anyone understand the 
I 
difficulties of the German settlement without seeing it in the proper 
context of the East--West struggle, without realizing the potential 
dangers inherent in the German rearmament, or without taking account of 
the Sovie t fears of a rearmed Germany? 
As long as Russia's main interest was focused on a settlement of 
the Korean and Indochinese questions, positive steps in Europe could 
hardly be expected. A Russia which was preoccupied with avoiding German 
rearmament through the European Defense Community or throug h other means 
could hardly be expected to seriously seek a solution of the Austrian 
question. Vital interests of a nation naturally have priority. 
K last important point, is the close connection between domestic 
and foreign policy. Instability within the country, manifest after 
Stalin's death and c.ontinuing to exist due to the power struggle between 
Khrush chev and Malenkov, was not conducive to making major concessions in 
f orei gn policy, especially if these concession involved retreat from a 
cer tai n controversial position. No one will doubt that a free and 
independent Austria would have entailed concessions which Malenkov was 
unable and. unwilling to make at that time. 
Why then, i.ras it possible for Khrushchev to make these con-
cessions and to res tore a free and independent Austria7 This question 
will be explored in the final chapter. 
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VIII 
WHY THE SOVIET UNION SIGNED THE 
AUSTRIAN TREATY IN 1955 
Up to this point the study has dealt with the historical facts of 
the negotiations and the cumbersome and exhausting discussions over the 
various clauses of the treaty. The readers attention has been drawn to 
Molotov's speech on February 8, 1955, in which he indicated that a 
solution of the Austrian question was possible, and to the developments 
between the speech and the news dispatches announcing that Austria was 
free again. The discussion of Soviet foreign policy after Stalin revealed 
certain important changes which were responsible for the new positive 
policy toward Austria. 
While the first step of finding the modifications is fairly easy, 
the second step of analysing and interpreting these facts is much more 
difficult. Involved is an evaluation of certain actions, and an 
evaluation is always in some measure subjective. No doubt developments 
before and after a certain action can be and in fact have been used here 
to verify and substantiate the hypotheses presented. But one has to bear 
in mind that, particularly with regard to policy decisions of the Soviet 
Union, the material available is limited; in many cases sources are only 
disclosed a long time after the event took place, if they are disclosed 
at all. This does not preclude a meaningful and valuable analysis of 
certain policy decisions; it only points out the limits within which such 
an analysis has to remain. 
76 
A discussion of the motives or reasons for Russian -withdrawal 
from Austria encounters precisely the above mentioned limitations. Molotov 
or Khrushchev did not indicate the real reason for ' the Russian move, and 
even if their statements are examined in this context, great difficulty 
lies in deciding what is propaganda and what indicates the real motives 
behind a certain policy. For these reasons other sources must be explored 
I 
to find an explanation for the Russian willingness to sign the State 
Treaty. 
The foreign policy of a country is basically determined by t-wo 
I 
factors. First, the foreign policy of any country depends on the 
international situation at a given time. Although the foreign policy of 
a superpo-wer such as Russia helps to shape a given international situation 
to a large extent, it is also a reaction to international events. Thus it 
is obvious that part of the ans-wer to the question why the Russians signed 
the Treaty has to be found in the international situation prevailing at 
that time. Secondly, every foreign policy is closely connected with 
domestic events. 1 It would be utterly wrong to assume that foreign policy 
does exist by itself and is not subject to domestic events. The change in 
foreign policy after Stalin's death is an excellentexample of this 
interdependence. 11You cannot have a Stalinist f 1oreign policy 'Without 
Stalin," commented Professor Ulam.2 
111 The principles of the Communist Party on questions of foreign 
policy are an integral part of the program, strategy and tactics of the 
Party." Kommunist, No. 7 cited in Current Digest of th e Soviet Press, 
Vol. V, No. 20. p. J. 1 
2Dr. Adam Bruno Ulam, of Harvard University, in an interview, 
April, 1965 . Permission to quote secured. 
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Thus domestic events might provide the cause for a /certain action in the 
field of international politics, \.Jhich otherwise would be hard to explain 
if one looked only into the international situation. There is ample 
evidence that changes in the Soviet leadership had and still have their 
repercussions in international politics, yet it is difficult to measure 
the rE@-l impact they have on Russian foreign policy. The answer to the 
above questi on, therefore, must be found primarily in the international 
field, leaving the detailed evaluation of the relationship between 
domestic and foreign policy to an expert on Soviet government. 
Before proceeding to the analysis proper one other premise has to 
be established. Hardly any policy decision in internati onal politics can 
be attributed to one single factor. National interest, the aims of the 
policy makers and existing international conditions all contribute to the 
final decision. The process of making a decision consists in the careful 
balancing of the advantages and disadvantages of a given step. If a 
certain action would be contrary to the national J interest of a nation, 
and if the nation is able to make its own decision without outside 
pressure, then the nation will decide against the action. If the 
advantages prevail over the disadvantages, then t he nation will take the 
step. This was precisely the situatio n in which Russia found herself in 
the spri ng of 1955. 
Russia's biggest headache in Europe, Western Germany, was beyond 
her re a ch. Despite a year-long war (propaganda war to be sure), Russia 
l ost the battle against Western determination to rearm Germany. The 
London and Paris Agreements establishing the Western European Union 
provided for German rearmament. This inclusion of West Germany into the 
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West . n defense system called for similar steps by the satellite countries, 
and these steps were taken on May 14, 1955, when the Warsaw Treaty 
Organiz ation was formed in Warsaw. Thus Europe was more or less divided 
int o two military camps 'With a few exceptions; Austria was one of them. 
The East ern part of Austria was surrounded by Communist satellite 
cou.Dtrie s, namely Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Yugoslavia, while NATO 
powers were situated at the southern and northern boundaries. Switzerland, 
a neutral country, completed the picture in the west. 
But the European theater was not the only area in which the Soviet 
Union was interested. There were many other developments which required 
Soviet att ention.For instance the pending summit conference or the 
disar mament talks which had been carried on for quite a while, and in 
which the Soviet Union seemed to be very interested.3 In the light of the 
new Soviet policy toward the underdeveloped countries, the Bandung 
conference in April 1955 was certainly of great importance for the 
Russians. As a matter of fact, this conference has been regarded as a 
great success for the Soviet Union, since it was a symbol of Communist 
and neutralist cooperation, and brought the Soviet Union, under whose 
protection the conference took place, a little closer to the Asian and 
African world.4 The desirability of these closer contacts is obvious in 
Jo n May 10, 1955, the USSR repres entative Y. A. Malik submitted a 
Proposal of t he Soviet Government on International Control of Armaments, 
Reduction and Pr ohibit ion of Atomic Weapons to the Subcommittee of the 
UN Disarmament Commission. 
4David J. Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin (New York: 
J.B. Lippincott Company, 1961), p. 302. 
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view of a new trend in the Soviet foreign policy. Professor Dallin 
describes it as follows: "Khrushchev was planning a 'grand offensive' in 
the underdeveloped countries of Asia and Africa. 115 Neutralism, once 
re gard ed as another form of capitalism, was suddenly accepted. India, at 
one time heavily attacked by the Soviet press, now became Russia's friend. 
The Soviet Union promised her aid in building steel mills; in July 1955, 
a three year Soviet-Burmese trade agreement was concluded. The Soviets 
provided Afghanistan with arms. In November and December 1955, Bulganin 
and Khrushchev visited India, Burma and Afghanistan. All these steps can 
only be interpreted as a shift of Soviet interest to a new and so far 
little explored area. 
On the domesti c scene Khrushchev's power position was still newly 
acquired and needed consolidation. In order to carry out this very 
delicate and dangerous task, a reduction in international tensions was 
very desirable. Yet consolidation of his position in Russia was not 
Khrushchev ' s only concern. The Soviet Bloc showed a number of independent 
t r ends whic h, if not carefully checked, might possibly lead to revolt and 
di :-~.nteg r ation of the Bloc. Events such as the Polish strike or the 
upris in g in the Eastern zone of Germany could not be disregarded. Austria 
was just another one of these major or minor problems to disturb 
Khrushc hev's mind. 
What were the reasons for Khrushchev's decision t o withdraw from 
Austria? In order to find an answer, the Austrian question must be 
5I bid ., p. 279. 
projected against the above menti oned domestic and international 
developments. In the course of this stu dy eight major reasons for this 
Soviet decision have suggested themselves. 
l• Austria Was llQ. Loss for th e Russians 
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All t hing s consi dered, _the Russians really did not lose very much 
in leaving Austria. True enough, the Russian withdrawal represented a 
real concession in so far as it is the only case where the Soviet Union 
re trea ted from an established position in Europe. But in Austria the 
advantages of a i.rl.thdrawal by far outweighed the advanta ges of staying 
there. Looked at from the point of view of prestige, Russia's move was 
carefully planned. The differences with regar d to the state treaty were 
settled in bi lateral talks between Austria and the Soviet Union. It was 
there that the major difficulties were removed without the active 
par ticipation of t he Western Powers. Thus Russia was able to point to the 
Soviet initiati ve and to claim the l i on's share in the successful 
conclu sion of the Aust rian State Treaty. Since Russia's step was not a 
reactio ~ to a Western action, but was initiated by the Soviet Union her~ 
se~f, sh e did not suffer any loss of prestige at all. On the cont ra ry, it 
was a gain in prestige, since Russia could claim credit for getting the 
negotiation s under way. 
Secondly, Austria was no loss militarily. With regard to the 
occupa tion pattern of Austria, by far the l argest area was occupied by 
French, American and British troops. By agreeing to withdraw Russian 
troops from Austria, the .Soviet Union forced t he Western Powers to 
evacuate a much larger area than her own. The Russians had to retreat 
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only into Hungary which left them virtually at the gates of Vienna, wile 
the Western troops had to retreat much further. Khrushchev pointed to this 
very fact in his speech before the Central Committee in July 1955, -when he 
stated that although Russia had to give up some bases, the West had to do 
it too, and by making Austri a a neutral country the military potential of 
the enemy was not enhanced.6 
Thirdly, Austria -was no real economic loss. Throughout the ten-
year occupation the Russians had exploited Austria as much as possible. 7 
In 1955 Austria virtually had to buy her State Treaty from the Russians, 
as the clauses in the Austrian State Treaty . reveal. Russia made a very 
good bargain by granting Austria her independence. Fourthly, the Soviet 
Union did not lose anything in the ideolo gica l field. The Austrian 
Connnunist Party and the Russian occupation forces had failed completely 
to attract Austrians to their ideology. The numerous failures and defeats 
of the Austrian Communists are ·a vivid testimony to the rejection of 
Communism by the Austrian population. Again Khrushchev used this fact in 
his def ense of the Austrian solution at the above mentioned session of 
the Centr al Committee by pointing out that not even the Eastern zone of 
Austria was socialist; thus the socialist camp did not suffer a loss by 
neutralizing the country. 
6Dallin, .QI?.• £.li., p. 228. 
7see Chapter VI for further details. 
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6· Aust ria~~ Propag anda Victory fQ;t th e Soviet Union 
As already indicated under the previous heading, the Soviet Union 
took the initiative in opening the final stage of the negoti ations. She 
not only took _the initiative, but she excluded the Western Powers from 
the negotiations and put the United States, Great Britain and France in 
t he rat her awkward position of having to ratify (more or less) the Moscow 
Memorandum. Problems which had held up the conclusion of the negotiations 
for years were suddenly solved within a matter of months without the 
participation of the Western Powers. Thus the Soviet Union, on the one 
hand, could proudly point to her peaceful intentions and show that she 
really believed in peaceful coexist ence, and that international problems 
could be solved at the conference table. On the other hand, she could 
allege that the Soviet Union was always interested in a solution of the 
Austrian question--a slogan which appeared many times in the Soviet press--
and t ha t it was only the Western Powers which had prevented the conclusion 
of a state treaty. As the New Worl d Review in its June 1953 issue pointed 
out, it had been generally conceded in the press that it was the "notable 
concessions of the USSR that had made agreement possible. 118 There is no 
doubt about the fact that only the Soviet Union was in the position to 
grant Austria her independence. The explanation naturally lies in the 
f act that it was primarily Soviet opposition which had frustrated efforts 
to conclude a treaty. Yet this aspect of the picture was very skillfully 
omitted; Soviet politicians could allude to their peaceful intentions, 
and they could stress the fact that the real efforts and concessions of 
8New World Revi ew, June 1953, p. 3. 
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the Soviet Union led to Austria's i ndependence and freedom. No doubt, t he 
Aust rian settle ment is probably the best example of peaceful coexistence. 
]. A Settlement of the Austrian Question .Would Decre ase Intern ational 
Tension 
It has been pointed out before that the Soviet Union was interested 
in a decrease of international tensions. Khrushchev's new policy of 
pea ceful coexistence could be pursued only in an atmosphere where not 
everybody was determined to cut everybody else's ~hroat. Going back to the 
change in leadership in 1953, a gradual improve ment of the rel ati ons 
between East and West occurred from that time on. Khrushchev, as the new 
leade~ , was determined to decrease tensions further. The events after the 
si n' i ng of the Austrian State Treaty would seem to show that Khrushchev 
initiated a new course in Soviet foreign policy. The opposition to 
Molotov at the session of the Central Committee in July 1955, indicated 
that Khrushchev was not willin g to base his foreign policy on the 
principles of the Stalin era. His policy was that of peaceful coexistence. 
President Eisenhower had stated in a speech on April 16, 1953, that it was 
deeds and not mere words that counted. The Soviet press had devoted much 
attention to that speech. EisenhOi~er's remarks were reported in Pravda 
and Izvestia, and the two papers more than once linked conciliatory moves 
of the Soviet Union to the demand for deeds. New World Review joined the 
general trend. 11This continuing series of dee ds designed to relieve 
international tensions, demonstrates the sincerity of the Soviet Union in 
their efforts for peace, and point up the necessity of an early top level 
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meetin g . 119 The Austrian tr eaty question offered Khrushchev a unique 
opportunity to prove Russia's good intentions by a deed, as demanded by 
President Eisenhower. I zves tia. wrote on March 27, 1955: "After all, 
. . 
.American officials themselves have frequently called the Austrian 
question the 'touchstone' for solving urgent international problems. 1110 
The timing of this action was good; it occurred shortly before the summit 
conference, which had been planned for quite a long time. The good 
relations between Eisenhower and Marshal Georgi Zhukov were stress ed. 
Zhukov said in an interview: 11We spoke as soldiers and saw no grounds 
for -war between our countries. 1111 Shortly before the summit conference 
too k pl ace, New Worl d Revi ew reported that the conclusion of the Austrian 
State Treaty provided a hopeful background for the forthcoming conference. 12 
I t i s obvious, therefore, that the Russians were interested in decreasin g 
international tensions. 
To the above stated reasons might be added another one: their ne-wly 
initiated campaign in the underdeveloped countries. This marked change in 
the Russian attitude toward the countries in Asia and Africa went hand in 
hand wit h t he doctrine of peaceful coexistence. The success of the new 
policy depe nded to a large extent on the belief of these countries that 
t he Soviet Union was honestly striving for peace. The conclusion of an 
9New World Revie w, July 1953, p. 24. 
10current Diges t of the Sovi et Press , Vol. VII, No. 13, p. 26. 
11New Wo:rld Revi ew, :tliarch 1955, p. 9. 
12J bid ., June 1955, p. 8. 
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Austrian treaty was a dramatic enough proof of these peaceful intentions. 
Russia's emphasis on peaceful coexistence and her actual efforts to 
decr ea se in t ernational tensions, together with anti-imperialistic slogans, 
. s eemed to be a very good approach to winning the support of some of the 
Afro- Asian countries. 
~. The New Sovi et Attit ude Toward Neutr al ity~~ Neutral Austr i a 
Possi ble 
As Professor Dallin observes: 11There was no place in Stalinism for 
neutral nations or parties. For Stalin, the world was divided into two 
camps--the capitalist and the socialist--and there was no room for 
anyone between the fronts. 1113 After Stalin's death the policy underwent 
gradual modification and took a decisive turn into a pro-neutralist 
attitude after Khrushchev won power. Evidence of this trend appears in 
t he Br....ndung Conference of April 1955, which took place under Soviet 
sponsorship, and in the new attitude toward the non-aligned countries 
such as India, Burma or Afghanistan (seep. 81). 
Thus neutrality was no longer equated with capitalism: the Soviet 
Union realized that there was a third group of countries which belonged 
neither to the socialist camp nor the capitalist camp, but which 
occupied a central position. The Soviet Union now looked at the situation 
realistically. It was true, a neutral or non-aligned country was no gain 
for the socialist camp, but, more important, it was not a gain for the 
capi talist camp. Neutral countries were at least an in direct asset. A 
13Dallin, .£2• cit., p. 290. 
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realistic appraisal of the Austrian situation made neutrality possible 
and perhaps desirable (see below). It was better to have a unified, neutral 
Austria than to hand over the western part to the capital ist carnp. A 
neutral Austria was actually an advantage for Khrushchev. Seen in 
relation to the other neutral Asian and African countries, this step 
could only enhance Russia's prestige in these areas. 
i• ! Neutr al Austria Was s · Loss to the North Atla ntic Trea ty Organiz at ion 
According to a press comment, an advantage of an independent, 
neutral Austria was that "The agreement reached in Moscow precludes Austria's 
entr y i nto aggressive militar-J alliances and coalitio ns like the North 
Atlan t ic Bloc and the Western European Union . 114 In view of its location 
and looked at in the light of international developments in 1954 and 1955, 
lit tl e Austria suddenly achieved a rather important strategic position. 
The Par i s and London Agreements created the Western European Union (WEU) 
which was to include two new members, West Germany and Italy. WEU, linked 
to l1IATO, covered almost all of central Europe with the exception of 
Swltze rland and Austria. Western Austria, together with Switzerland, 
sepa r ated West Germany from Italy, two NATO powers. The inclusion of 
Western Austria in NATO would have been very desirable from the Western 
poL"'J.t of view. Articles in Western newspapers had in fact oft en discussed 
this possibility. In the light of new developments, with Germany becoming 
a member of NATO, the inclusion of Western Austria into this organization 
was by no means a utopian idea, especially if the stalemate in the 
14Pravda cited in Current Digest of the Soviet Pres s , Vol. VII, 
No. 16, p. 24. 
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negotiations on an Austrian treaty continued for much longer. The leaders 
in the Kremlin appeared to be very much aware of this fact. Izvestia 
stated in March 1955: 
11 
••• the answer to this question15 is found in the alarm 
expre ss ed by the British newspaper Daily Express over the fact that 
the opportunity to settle the Austrian problem threatens to end the 
Western powers occupation of Austria. This is what these powers fear, 
this is what they don't want. 11 
11 
••• th e press reports that the Western powers ass;ign Austria 
the role of 1Alpine stronghold 1 of the Atlantic bloc. 1116 
There was only one way of preventing Austria's participation in 
t he NATO alliance: to make Austria a free and neutral country. It is true 
that the Russians had to sac ri fice some bases, but as already pointed out 
before, this was not a real sacrifice; on the c0ntr~·y, this was a great 
advant age. It was far more important that Austria, together with 
Switzer lan d, cut the NATO bloc in half, interrupting land and air 
corrmunica t ions betwe en the NATO forces in Germany and Italy. Khrush chev 1 s 
j~sti f ica tion of his policy toward Austria brings out that very point. By 
making Austria neutral, the military potential of the enemy was not 
increased . The seeming concession of the Russians turned out to be an 
important gain for the Soviet Union. 
Q• The Warsaw Treaty Made Withdrawal llQ.ill Austria Possible 
It has been brought out more than once tha t one of the main 
justifi cations for the stationing of Soviet troops in Hungary and 
Ruma.nia was the necessity of maintaining supply and communication lines 
15The article dealt with the rather mixed reaction of the West to 
the new Soviet move. 
16 Curre nt Digest .Qf ~ Soviet Press , Vol. VII, No. 11, p. 27. 
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for the Rus sian occupation forces in Austria . In fact, the peace treaties 
with Hungary and Rumania explicitly granted that right to the Soviet 
Union . The developments in the satellite bloc before and after the 
si gnin g of the Austria. ~ State Treaty clearly indicated that without the 
pre senc•' of Sovie t troops in these countries, Russia would not have been 
a · le -r,o bui l d and maintain her satellite empire. As long as there was no 
substitute for the guarantees in the Hungarian and Rumanian peace treaties, 
Russia could hardly be expected to sign an Austrian treaty and withdraw 
her troops fro m Austria, since such a move would have necessitated the 
withdrawal of troops also from Hungary and Rumania. 17 The events in 1956 
in Hungary proved that a withdrawal of Soviet troops might have had 
disastrous effects from the point of view of the Russians. 
Tne new defense pact, the Warsaw Treaty Organization, the counter-
part to NATO, eliminated t his problem. Under the terms of the Warsaw · 
Treaty, the Soviet Union could station troops in the countries concerned. 
Since one of t he main objectives of the Soviet Union was thus achieved, 
it was possible to sign the Austrian State Treaty . Now the Soviet Union 
could withdraw her forces into Hungary, and could thus still exercise 
the fun ct ion of a police power in the satellite countries. 
7. An Indenende nt Neutr al Austr ia would be~ Safeg uard Agai ns t~ New 
AnschJu ss 
From sta tements by Soviet officials as well as press releases in 
17 Tnese implications of a wit hdrawal of Soviet troo ps fro m Austria 
.c::..-,:1t give some explanation for the Soviet proposal at the Berlin Con-
fe_ence in 1954, which provided for a signing of the treaty, but insisted 
on the ccnt i nued station ing of troops in Austria. 
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Pr avda and I zve stia , the possibility of a future Anschluss was of greater 
concern to the Russians than generally believed. The fear of a new 
Anschl uss was not a theme brought up just around 1955, but was mentioned 
through out the ten years of occupation. Whenever there was a sign of more 
friendly rel ations between Austria and Germany, Russia raised protests in 
the All ie d Council for Austria, and Prav da and Izv estia started to attack 
Austria, acc using her of planning a new union with Germany. Numerous 
articl es and editorials warned Austria against siding with Germany on any 
issue, sin ce it might lead to a new Anschluss. Any step toward closer 
econ omic ti es with Germany brought dow.n on Aust ria a flood of warnings 
snd acc~sa ti ons. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to look into the 
reasons and origins of these fears. It is enough to be aware of these 
fears and to take them into consideration when discussing the Austrian 
solution. 
Pravda commented that a treaty with Austria was possible 11if an 
agreement is concluded on measures to make impossible a new Austrian 
Anschluss with Germany. 1118 At another point Pravda stated: "Even if one 
agreed that the danger of an Anschluss is not urgent today, is there any 
real basis for saying that it might not become urgent tomorrow? 1119 The 
inclusion of Western Austria in the Western European Union, whi ch seemed 
to be at le as t a distant possibility at that time, might have resulted 
sooner or later in a closer alliance between Austria and Germany, the 
very thing the Russians had opposed for so many years. Thus an Austrian 
18Dallin, .Ql2.• cit ., p. 255. 
19curr ent Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. VII, No. 11, p. 27. 
90 
tr ea ty re-establis hing a free and neutral country could only further 
Russian aims in this respect, particularly since the treaty was to include 
an express prohibition against any future Anschluss. 
I t is impossible to determine how much of this opposition to a new 
Anschluss was genuine concern and how much was plain propaganda. It seems, 
however, reasonable to assume that it was one of the major factors in the 
Soviet decision to ·sign · the treaty. 
a. Pressi ng Domesti c Proble ms~ Improved Relations wit h the West 
More Desirable 
Last but not least there were problems within the Communist camp 
which certainly had their bearing upon the decisions with regard to the 
Austrian State Treaty. Figuring prominently here were, on the one hand, 
the power struggle within the Soviet Union, and on the ot her hand, the 
proble ms created by events in the satellite countries. Any chan ge in 
leadership in Russia involves a great deal of behind-the-scenes struggle, 
about which there is usually scant information. 'When Khrush chev and 
Bulganin became the new leaders of the Soviet Union several problems had 
to be settled, .and the influence of certain personalities had to be 
reduced or eliminated. The growing differences between Molotov and the 
new le adership reveal this process at work. At the meeting of the Central 
Cornmi ttee in July 1955, Molotov's views met with unani mous disapproval. 
Khrushchev's throne, however, was by no means secure; at times, in fact, 
it was very shaky. This became clear especially in the years 1956 and 
1957 with the formation of the anti-Khrus hchev party, which almost 
brought about his downfall. Khrushchev, obviously, was very much 
i LJtere s te d in maintaining his newly acquired position as leader of the 
Sovie t Union . This certainly called for a very skillful foreign policy, 
avoiding major risks and not exposing any weaknesses of the new leader-
ship. It was much more desirable to come to some kind of agree ment with 
the West in order to avoid being tied down with external issues. A 
relaxation in the international field enabled Khrushchev to face the 
domestic problems with undivided attention. 
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Internal Russian affairs, however, were not the only Communist 
probl ems Khrushchev had to cope with. The policy of relaxation had led to 
some undesirable repercussions in the satellite bloc. Aside from the 
already well known independent course of Yugoslavia, other satellites 
began to show signs of unrest. The strikes of 1953 in Poland and Eastern 
Germany were early indications. This trend finally led to the Hungarian 
upr isin g in fall 1956, which bad to be crushed by brutal force. 
All t he se events, both in Russia herself and in the satellites 
made a red uction in international tensions desirable. Since Austria offered 
t he best opportunity to demonstrate the peaceful intentions of the Soviet 
Unio n, th e Russians were willing to sign the Treaty. Thus conciliatory 
2.c ,,ion in the international field gave Russia the latitude to deal w:i. th 
the inte r nal problems of the Communist bloc more efficiently. 
It seems appropriate to discuss in this context one other 
motiv ation which is sometimes attributed to the Russians . It has often 
been maintained that one of the reasons why the Soviet Union signed the 
Austrian State Treaty was to show Germany the way to achieve unification. 
Taking into consi deratio n the size and geographi cal positio n as well as 
the history of Germany, it seems highly unlikely that the Soviet Union 
9.2 
was seriously trying to find the solution in a neutral Germany. The 
proble ms raised by a neutral Germany would have been very great. Who 
would guarantee Germany's neutrality? Who would be able to stop a free 
and independent Germany from deciding to rearm again? The nature of 
Germany's economy requires a large amount of exports and imports, bound 
to lead to strong ties with some of the trading partners. If one of the 
trading partners happened to be the United States, and this would most 
likely be the case, would close economic ties with this capitalist nation 
constitute a violation of the status of neutrality? These problems exist 
even with re gard to Austria today, which is a fairly small country 
compared to Germany. In the case of Germa.ny such problems would be 
magnified many times and would cause continuous friction between the East 
and the West . 
Aside from these implications of neutrality, West Germany had just 
become a member of the West ern European Union, and a realistic Soviet 
leader coul d have hardly expected Germany to give up that l ong-fou ght for 
position. Molotov, in fact, clearly indicated that a neutral Germany 
could not be the solution. 11It would be a great blunder, if the German 
issue were to be solved on a similar basis (he was referring to the 
Austrian solution). 1120 These were not the only reasons which militate 
against a neutral Gc:rr:::any, but they suffice to make it clear that a neutral 
Germany would have been unacceptable both to the East and the West • 
.20Dallin, _sm. cit., p. 230. 
CONCLUSION 
If any major conclusion emerges from the preceding pages it is 
that a policy decision in the international field cannot be attributed 
to one single factor. Any policy decision seems to depend, on the one 
hand, on an interaction between international and domestic developments, 
and on the othe r hand, on the power constell at ion within the international 
realm. Domestic events may make for a more conciliatory policy in the 
international field, as was the case after Stalin's death in 1953 and 
als o after ¥..alenkov 1 s resignation in 1955. Domestic events, however, may 
also increase international instability or lead to stalemate and deadlock, 
a situation prevailing in the last few years of Stalin's reign. The ot her 
chara cterist ic of foreign policy is its relation to other international 
develo pments taking place at a certain time. As previously indicated, any 
de cisio n in international politics will _ be action and reaction at the 
same t i me. Action stands for the motives, for the ethos of the leaders; 
r eac t ion is t he response to the international environment. To put it in 
~ore concre te terms, if a ruling elite wishes to take a certain action, 
i 0 is ne cessary to look first at the international situation and determine 
whether a certain action is feasible and if it is, whether the implications 
or r esu lt s of th is action will be advantageous or disadvantageous for the 
country con cerne d . This evaluation process is vital, and in many cases 
the factor s involved are so numerous that any clear decision is dif ficult. 
This leads to the further conclusion that the aims of the leadership and 
t he possibilities of action in the international theater do not fully 
coincide at all tim es. Thus, although the foreign policy of · a country 
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will show a high degree of conti nuity, there are many decisions which 
cr eate the impres sion that they do not quite fit into the general line of 
policy of a given country. But a closer analysis of the specific policy 
decision will almost always reveal that there is no real contr adicti on 
between the de cision and the general line of policy. The contradictio n 
might only be superficial. 
Austria is an exce llent exampl e . Khrushche v, in commenting on the 
Aust rian solution, said himself that one of the basic principles of 
Lenin's strategy was to "take temporary losses entailed in a strug gl e f or 
higher gains . 1121 This proves that, although the Russian withdrawal from 
Austria seemed to be a contra di ction to the general line of policy, 22 it 
can best be regarded as a tempor ary l oss for highe r gains . The atte mpt 
has been made in the preceding pages to point out some of these highe r 
aims . Some aims were of a short- term nature, such as more f r eed om in 
deali ng ~~th problems within Russia a..~d the Communist bloc, or the 
decrease in int ernati onal tensions which was desirable at that time . Other 
aims had long-term i mpli cations, such as preventing Austria's membership 
in the North Atlanti c Treaty Organizatio n, or the demonstration of a new 
attitude toward neut ral countries, which had a gr eat impact on the 
relations between the Soviet Union and the underdeveloped countries in 
Asia and Africa . 
22
!1The t r eaty was significant because it marked the first 
vo L;;,-.:,:-~y post - war withdrawa l by the Soviet leaders from an est ablished 
pos __ ,,ion i n the c ent er of Eur op e. 11 Alvin Z. Rubinstein (ed.), The Fo r eign 
Polic y of the .Sovi et Unior1 (New York ; Random House, 1960 ) , p . 283. 
It seems that in the ca se of Austria the Russian policy makers 
carefully balanced the pros and cons of withdrawal from Austria and 
finally arrived at the conclusion that it was more advantageous for the 
Soviet Union to withdraw from Austria. There are some indications that 
Russia would have preferred a solution which did not entail her 
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withdrawal from Austria . If the Soviet Union, however, was really 
interested in some of the above stated higher aims, as she see med to be, 
the withdrawal from Austria could only be advantageous. It is, furthermore, 
important to recall that for the first time since the end of the Second 
World War the Soviet Union was able to withdraw her troops from Austria, 
due to the Warsaw Treaty. As to the economic concessions, it has already 
been pointed out that Austria had to pay a very high price for her 
freedom. 
One can, therefore, arrive at the conc lusi on that the Austrian 
independence was, from the Russian point of view, the most advantageous 
or most profitable one. The correlation between the aims of the leaders 
on the one hand , and the domestic and international developments on the 
ot her hand, tipped the scales in favor af a free, indep endent and neutral 
Austr ia, and the Iron Curtain went down not at the Enns, but at the 
Austr o-Hungar ian border. 
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APPENDIX A 
SOVIET- AUSTRIAN COMMUNIQUE1 
MOSCOW, APRIL 15, 1955 
From April 12, 1955, until April 15, 1955, discussions were held 
in Noscow between an Aust ri an Gover_nment Delegati on headed by Chancell or 
Jul ius Raab and Vice - Chancellor Dr. Adolf Schaerf and a Soviet Delegation 
headed by the Deputy Chair man of the Counc il of Mini sters for Foreign 
A_fai r s, V. M. Molotov, and t he Deputy Chairman of t he Council of Minister, 
A. I. Vrikoyan, which were carrie d out in a fri endl y sp irit. 
As a res ul t of dis cussions by both sides the State Government of 
the Soviet Union as well as t he Government of 'the Republic of Austria 
conside r as desi rabl e the earliest conclusion of a St ate Treaty on the 
establishi~ent of an inde pendent and democratic Austria which should 
serve t he na tional i nte r ests of peace in Europe. 
The Austri an Dele gation gave assurances that t he Austrian Republi c, 
in t he spi rit of the declaration made at the Berlin Conferenc e in 1954, 
intends not to join any military al li ances or permit military bases on 
her te r r itory and will pursue a policy of i ndepen dence in re gard to all 
st ates whic h should insure the observa..i.1ce of this declaration. 
Exodus This Year Agreed 
The Soviet si de expressed its agreement that the occupa~io n forces 
of the f our powers be withdraim f ro m Aust ria upon t he entering into force 
of the Stat e Treaty a.~d in any case not later th an December 31, 1955. 
Ta~~ing i nto consideration t he declaration of the Unit ed States, 
Britain and France made public on Apri l 5, of this year to t he effect tha t 
t hey ar e striving to achi eve t he earliest conc lu sio n of an Austrian St ate 
Trea t y, the Soviet Unio n and Austria expres s the hope that at t he pre sent 
time the re are favorable opport unities f or conclusion of a treaty by means 
of appropr iate agree ment among t he Four Powers in Austria . 
The Soviet Govern ment agre ed in the third of its state ment s at the 
c:: .. c:·e:re::1ce a t Berlin in 1954 to accept the equivalent of $150,0 00,0 00 
p:rovic:.ecl fo r by Article 35 of the Austrian Tre aty fully in the del.i.very 
of Austri;: 1.n goods . 
z~e Soviet Government declare d its readiness i n addition, for the 
early fo rseen transfer of former German pr operty in the Soviet zone of 
occup ied Austria, to tran sfe r to Austria immediately after conclu si on of 
the State Treaty, for pro per reco mpense, t he property of the Danube 
Steamshipping Company (DDSG), i nclu di ng the ship yards and Korneuburg 
dock and all ve ss els and port installations . 
1New York Times , Apri l 16, 1955, p. 2. 
103 
Oil Fields to be Yielded 
:'he Soviet Government agreed further to cede to Austria the oil 
::.::..c..Lu.S :ind refineries, including t he company for trade in oil products, 
ORC?, defi. ~ed as belon ging to Austria in Article 35 of the State Treaty, 
i n exchang e for the delivery of crude oil in amounts agreed to by t he 
parties ;, 
Moreover , agreement was reached to enter into negotiations in the 
nea r future aimed at normalization of trade relations between Austria 
and the Sovie~ Union. 
The Soviet Delegation informed the Austrian Dele gation that the 
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR had expressed its consent to 
consider favorably the request of the Aust rian Federal President, Dr. 
Koer ne r, about the return of the Austrians to their motherland who are 
servin g ter ms at the decision of the Soviet Court organ. 
After the withdrawal of the Soviet occupation troops from Austria, 
not a sin gle rrQlitary prisoner or detained civilian person of Austrian 
citizenship ,ri.11 remain on the territory of the Soviet Union. 
APPENDIX B
TABLE I
NATIONALRATSWAHLEN 1945-19551 
(Elections to the National Assembly 1945-1955) 
1. ELECTIONS: NOVEMBER 1945 
3,449,605 eligible voters 
3,217,354 valid votes 
OeVP 
SPOe 
KPOe 
e:::ocr at i c 
?ar ty 
1,602,277 votes 
1,434,898 votes 
174,257 votes 
• 5,972 votes 
.:. ELECTIONS: OCTOBER 1949 
OeVP 
SPOe 
KPOe 
4,391,850 eligible voters 2 
4,246,239 voted 
4,189,366 valid votes 
1 , 846,381 votes 
1,624,024 votes 
213,066 votes 
Independents • 489,273 votes 
3. ELECTIONS: FEBRUAiiY 1953 
4,586,879 eligible voters 
4,395,176 voted 
4,319,274 valid votes 
OeVP 
SPOe 
KPOe 
Independents 
1 , 781 , 969 votes 
1 , 81 8, 811 votes 
228,228 votes 
• 473,022 votes 
85 seats in the National rat 
76 seats in the Nationalrat 
4 seats in the Nati onal r at 
0 seats in the Nati onalrat 
77 seats in the Nat ionalrat 
67 seats in the Nat ionalrat 
5 seats in the Nationalrat 
16 seats in the Nationalrat 
74 seats in the Nat ionalr at 
73 seats in the Nationalrat 
4 seats in the Nationalrat 
14 seats in the Nati onalrat 
105 
1Heinrich Siegler , Oesterreic hs Weg ~ Souver aenitaet, Neutr a-
litaet , Prosper i tae t, ~ -1.2i2 (Wien: Verlag fuer Zeitarchieve, 1959), 
pp . 16, 26, 32. 
2At the first elections former members of the Heimwehr and of the 
s~ur ~s char en (both paramilitary organiza ti ons) were disqualified from 
v::iting due to their connections with Hitlerism . 
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TABLE II 
THE REORGANIZATION OF THE AUSTRIAN POLICE FORCES1 
!• KRIMI NALBEAMTE (Criminal Investigators) 
1,235 men in t he service 1945 
1953 • 1,425 men had entered the service 
1,655 men had left the service 
]1. VERWALTUNGSDIENST DER POLIZEI (Administrative Branch of the Police) 
1946 
1953 
•• 3,4 18 men in the service 
1,081 men had entered the service 
2,235 men had left the service 
Q. SICHERHEITSWACHE (Security Police) 
1945 
1953 
• 6,152 men in the service 
.13,128 men had entered the service 
13, 093 men had left the service 
TABLE III 
GER.MAN OWNERSHIP OF AUSTRIAN CORPORATIONS I N 19442 
Banks ••••...•..•• 83 per cent 
Insurance ••.••••••. 61 per cent 
Smelting and VJ.ining . • • 72 per cent 
Machine and Metal • 64 per cent 
Chemical • 71 per ce..."1.t 
Electric •••• 82 per cent 
Construction .•• 56 per cent 
Wood • • • • • • • • 49 per cent 
Textile ••••••••••• 57 per cent 
Transportation • • • • • 58 per cent 
Oil. • • • • • • • • •• 50 per cent 
1Adolf Schaerf, Oesterreic hs Erneuerung, J..2.4i-~ (Wien: 
Verlag der Wiener Volksbuchh andlung, 1956), P• 150. 
2william L. Stearman, The Soviet Union and :!ill&. Occupation Qf 
Austri a (Wien: Verlag fuer Zeitarchieve, 1957), P• 25. 
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FIGURE II 
DIVISION OF VIENNA INTO SECTORS2 
I. 
7,8 , 9,18,19 . 
2,20,21,22. 
6,14,15,16,17. f-
4, 1 o. 
b !Russian Sector comprising districts 2,4j10,20,21,22 • 
....._ __ ~!Bri tish Sector comprising dist ric ts 3,5,1 1,1 2,13 • 
........ ~....._,~American Sector comprising distr icts 7,8,9 ,18,19 . 
lo 0 2 °,0 ,)§tren ch Sector compri s i ng districts 6, 14, 15, 16, 17. 
Di st r ict I was under joint control of t he four Allies which took 
turns every month s. 
2J uli us Raab, Ve:cant wor tung f uer Oest err ei ch (Wien: 
oesterrei chis cher Wirtschaftsverla g, 1961), p. 31. 
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